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I. Introduction and Argument
Recently in South Africa' there have been animated
discussions about the need to "reform" corporate governance law
2
in the country to bring it up to "the 21st century."3 The discourse
on reforms is embodied in the 1973 decision of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI)4 to overhaul corporate governance in the
I See infra Part II (presenting a refresher on this country, memorably dubbed the
'rainbow nation,' in cognizance of an immense diversity so rich that it is metaphorically
equated to the colors of the rainbow).
2 Company law is the term South Africans, like the British from whom they
borrowed some of their legal ideas, use for "corporate law." Tshepo Mongalo, South
Africanizing Company Law for a Modem Global Economy, 121 S. AFR. L. J. 93, 93
(2004). The two terms are used interchangeably in this paper, although, instinctively, I
use "corporate law" more. Definitions of this and other terms of the study like corporate
governance (never "company governance") are provided in infra Part III.A
3 See generally Department of Trade and Industry, Gov'T GAZETrE No. 26493,
SOUTH AFRICAN COMPANY LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE
LAW REFORM (2004) [hereinafter GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM] available
at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette.notices/2004/26493.pdf.
4 The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) is one of 37 ministries or national
departments of the South African government. See
http://www.info.gov.za/aboutgovt/dept.htm (last visited March 23, 2007). The purposes
of the department include to "[p]rovide leadership to the South African economy," "[aict
as a catalyst for the transformation and development of the economy and respond to the
challenges and opportunities of the economic citizens, in order to support the
government's economic goals of growth, employment and equality," "[r]espond to the
[Vol. XXXII
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA
country to bring it into conformity with global trends, taking into
account the local context and peculiarities of South Africa.5 The
last such review took place over thirty years ago. The proposal for
this overhaul is embedded in a fifty-page policy paper released in
May 2004 and sets forth "the framework and guidelines for more
detailed technical consultation, which will provide the foundation
for the drafting of a new Companies Act," drawing on the body of
jurisprudence on this topic going back more than a century.6
The policy document promised "an overall review of company
law,"7 and the development of a "clear, facilitating, predictable
and consistently enforced law" that would provide "a protective
and fertile environment for economic activity."8 It proposed that
''company law should promote the competitiveness and
development of the South African economy" through various
means that include: (1) promoting the growth of enterprise and
entrepreneurship, thereby creating jobs, simplifying the procedures
for forming companies, and reducing the costs associated with the
formalities of forming a company and maintaining its existence;
(2) promoting innovation and investment in South African
companies and markets by providing flexibility in the design and
organization of companies, and a predictable and effective
regulatory environment; (3) promoting the efficiency of
companies and their management by, among other things, shifting
company law from a capital maintenance regime based on par
value to one based on solvency and liquidity; (4) encouraging
challenges and opportunities in the economy and society," and "[p]rovide a predictable,
competitive, equitable and socially responsible environment for investment enterprise
and trade." The Department of Trade and Industry, Overview of the DTI,
http://www.dti.gov.za/thedti/overview.htm (last visited March 7, 2007). For more on
this key department, see infra note 87 and accompanying text. The DTI's influence in
South Africa's economy is arguably likeable to the role of the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry as "economic general staff" in Japan's state-assisted capitalist
structure. See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE
GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (Stanford Univ. Press, 1982).
5 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 7; see also Mongalo,
supra note 2, at 121 passim.
6 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 7. The guidelines
are analyzed at greater length in infra Part IV (articulating the factors that lend impetus
to the impending reforms of South African corporate governance law).
7 Id. at 9.
8 /d. at 11.
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transparency and high standards of corporate governance; and (5)
harmonizing company law in South Africa with best practice
jurisdictions internationally by, among other things, ensuring that
company law sanctions should be de-criminalized where possible,
and avoiding over-regulation. 9 The changes can be summarized
by the acronym SFCTP: "S" denoting simplification, "F"
flexibility, "C" corporate efficiency, "T" transparency, and "P"
predictable regulation.'0 The policy paper addressed a number of
specific issues of corporate governance, including the laws
relating to company formation, corporate finance, shares and share
issuance, capital maintenance, corporate governance, mergers and
takeovers, insolvency and corporate rescue or winding up a
business, and the administration and enforcement of the law."
The policy paper formulated a new approach to the law of
corporate governance that packages and presents a replacement of
the old model that focused on shareholders. 2 This approach
balances "the interests of shareholders... with those of other
stakeholders when... appropriate and/or required by the
Constitution and related legislation."' 3  Under this approach, a
company conducts its "business activities with a view to
enhancing the economic success of the corporation, taking into
account, as appropriate, the legitimate interests of other
stakeholder constituencies [;]' '14 and considers "stakeholders, such
as the community in which the company operates, its customers,
its employees, its suppliers and the environment" when making
corporate decisions or developing strategy. 5 The document
9 Id. at 9; THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, COMPANIES BILL 2007, at 3-
5, available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/part1companyBill l 145.pdf.
10 COMPANIES BILL, supra note 9, at 3-5.
11 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 30-48.
12 The traditional approach focuses "on the role of directors, auditors and
shareholders in managing and overseeing [a] company's business primarily for the
benefit of the shareholders," said to own the company, and "[m]ost of the checks and
balances on the powers of the controllers of the company were aimed at ... primarily"
this one group. Id. at 24. Under this traditional approach, "the interests of the
shareholders are paramount and interests of other stakeholders" where factored in at all,
are considered only if advancing those interests will lead to maximization of profit for
shareholders. Id.
13 Id. at 25.
14 Id.
15 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 114.
[Vol. XXXIII
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA
embraced the King Committee's notion of a shift away from a
single bottom line that focused on profit for shareholders, to a
triple bottom line, encompassing the economic, environmental,
and social aspects of a company's activities. 16  Various
rationalizations provided in support of this new approach include
that the new guidelines "reflect the recognition that the company is
a social as well as an economic institution, and accordingly that
the company's pursuit of economic objectives should be
constrained by social and environmental imperatives, some of
which are provided for in legislative enactments; ' 17 that
"advancing the interests of other stakeholders is not invariably a
subordinate consideration to the primary goal of directors to act in
the best interest of the shareholders as a body;" 18 and that
"company law must acknowledge that companies as economic
agents have an impact on society and therefore on a broader range
of stakeholders" other than shareholders.19
The process of drafting and consultation associated with the
new reforms was expected to be completed by December of 2005
and a bill embodying the changes submitted to the South African
legislature (Parliament) by January of 2006.20 However, the
process became delayed and the bill did not make its way to
Parliament until one year later in the spring of 2007.21 The bill is
open for public comment until March 19, after which it goes to
Parliament in June 2007.22 If passed into law, the new Companies
Bill of 2007, like the policy paper, prepared and published by the
16 See GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 39 (indicating
that disclosures by companies "should extend not only to financial information, but
should also include statements on compliance with public interest legislation, including
the Black Economic Empowerment [BEE] Act, environmental regulation[,] and labor
regulation."). For more on the concept of "triple bottom line," see infra nn. 185-86 and
accompanying texts (discussing the King Reports and Code). For more on the BEE Act
and related affirmative action plans for blacks, see infra nn. 73-82.
17 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra, note 3 at 25.
18 Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
19 Id.
20 See id. at 49-50, 50 tbl. Three sub-issues covered under corporate governance
are (1) shareholders and investor protection, (2) directors and the structure of the Board,
and (3) disclosure and reporting. See id. at 35-39..
21 Id.
22 Nabelah Adams & Stephen Timm, CCs to Stay for Another 12 Years, Bus.
OWNER, March 7, 2007.
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Department of Trade and Industry,23 will repeal and replace the
Companies Act No. 61 of 1973 as well as "provide for the possible
future repeal of the Close Corporations Act No. 69 of 1984.
"
,24
The proposed legislation is also designed "[t]o provide for the
incorporation, registration, capitalization, organization and
management" of companies "to define the relationships between
companies and their respective shareholders or members and
directors [and] to provide for equitable and efficient mergers,
amalgamations and takeovers of companies, and for efficient
rescue of failing companies, [and] to provide appropriate legal
redress for investors and third parties with respect to companies. 25
The bill also established three institutions charged with
administrations of various aspects of the new law. These
institutions are (1) a Commission and a Takeover Regulation
Panel, which will administer the requirements of the Act with
respect to companies; (2) a Companies Ombud, which will
facilitate alternative dispute resolution and review decisions of the
Commission and the Takeover Regulation Panel; and (3) a
Financial Reporting Standards Council, which will advise on
requirements for financial record keeping and reporting by
companies.26
The movement for an overhaul of the law of corporate
governance now taking place in South Africa both tracks and
expands upon a general process of reassessment of corporate
governance in sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of the new
century. In 2000, at a "consultative meeting" held in Kenya, in
which fourteen African countries were represented, an agreement
23 An interesting development integral to the impending reforms in the law of
corporate governance in South Africa but also testimony to the influence of the DTI as
an impetus to change is that the black scholar and commentator on corporate reforms in
South Africa, Tshepo Mongalo, left his position in academia to become project manager
of corporate law reform with the DTI. See Zobuzwe Ngobes, Companies Act Needs
Much Work, Academic Says, July 28, 2003, available at
http://www.busrep.co.za/index.php?fsetld=561&Articleld=196690. Mongalo, the
author of CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A GLOBAL PICTURE OF
BUSINESS UNDERTAKINGS IN SOUTH AFRICA was, at the time this paper was written, a
Senior Lecturer in Business Law at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, in South Africa.
Id.
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was reached that there should be a "harmonized development of
corporate governance standards and practices in the continent that
takes into consideration the needs of the continent., 27  The
conferees assessed that "[t]he adoption of corporate governance
principles by African countries will be a giant step toward creating
safeguards against corruption and mismanagement, promoting
transparency in economic life and attracting more local and
foreign investment. ' 28 One year later, a conference and workshop
on corporate governance, instructively themed "Corporate
Governance for Sustainable Growth," took place in Accra, Ghana;
participants from a variety of countries, including Kenya, South
Africa, and the United States attended.29 Background discussion
from the conference proceedings indicated that "[t]he timing of the
conference coincided with the increased corporate governance
debate and awareness in Africa as in other emerging economies[,]"
importantly and revealingly adding: "[i]ncreasingly, Africa is
being called upon to take stock of its corporate governance
capacity. 3°  Consistent with the King Report(s) on Corporate
Governance in South Africa, to which they referred explicitly by
name, the conferees took a broad view of corporate governance
that encompassed "stakeholders.,, 31  The conferees drew an
instructive connection between governance generally and in the
corporate context. "Corporate governance brings the values of
democracy to the corporate level, and ensures that effective rules
of the game allow equal access and protection for all participating
in economic life. ' 32  Even more fundamentally, "[g]ood
27 CTR. FOR INT'L PRIVATE ENTER. & INST. FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, WEST AFRICA
CONFERENCE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE
GROWTH 3 (2001) [hereinafter CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH],
available at http://www/cipe.org/about/news/conferences/africa/ghana/pdf/ghana.pdf.
The Center for International Private Enterprise, based in the U.S., was one of three
organizations that sponsored the meeting. The Institute of Economic Affairs in Ghana
was another of the three sponsors. The name of the third organization, the Development
Policy Center (DPC), based in Nigeria, did not appear in the source title.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 3.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 6. For more on the King Reports and Code see infra nn. 185-193 and
accompanying texts.
32 CORPORATE CONFERENCE FOR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, supra note 27, at 3.
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governance, whether corporate or non-corporate, hinges on"
certain common denominator principles, including: accountability,
transparency, equity, open communication, participatory decision-
making and management, shared responsibility, and submission to
the rule of law.33 The conferees identified some of the key factors
distinguishing corporate governance in advanced economies from
governance in poorer economies of the kind found in "Black
Africa., 3 4 They also instructively dwelt on the possible influence
of privatization and corporate governance in Africa.35 In short, the
conferees appear to indicate that "[g]ood corporate governance"
cannot occur without "a good corporate culture."3 6
33 Id.
34 See id. at 8 (analyzing the role of financial markets). The basic argument is that
"[a] well-developed capital market promotes effective corporate governance." Id. Under
such a system, there is "a set of laws establishing voting and control rights for
shareholders, rules imposing on directors and officers certain fiduciary duties, among
others." Id. In these markets characterized by efficiency, transparency, and liquid
capital, "companies that are perceived to have poor corporate governance are punished in
the market place with low share prices." Id. In these systems where "widely-held public
companies represent a significant part of the corporate sector, the reality of proxy
contexts, hostile takeovers and leveraged buy-outs also exerts some discipline over
management." Id. These factors are non-existent in African countries where instead,
"there is a dominance of state enterprises or closely-held family-owned and managed
businesses." Id. To be sure, there are cases where shares are publicly held. However, in
these rare cases, represented by the likes of Ghana, a majority of the shares are held by
foreign parent companies. Id. The report pointed out that 12 of the 22 companies listed
on the Ghana Stock Exchange are foreign-controlled with control blocks as high as 72
percent. Id.
35 See id. at 14 ("[plrivatization of government ownership in enterprises is germane
to good corporate governance. Most state-owned enterprises . ..do not abide by
corporate governance rules and this ultimately affects the enterprise's performance and
therefore affects the taxpayer.").
36 See id at 4. The report does not seem to point to one silver bullet or overarching
strategy that leads to a desirable corporate culture in Africa. Rather, there is indication
that such a culture is the synergistic result of a series of small melding and welding steps
that include good governance in the larger society, a "good reputation industry," and
transparency. Id. Regarding the last, the report stated the hard-to-contest position that
"[p]eople are willing to invest time, money, sweat and tears in their own ventures only if
they believe that the market is transparent, and not rigged against them." Id.; accord,
MELVIN D. AYOGU, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: THE RECORD AND POLICIES FOR
GOOD GOVERNANCE (African Dev. Bank Econ. Research Paper No. 66 at 19) (2001)
(commenting regarding the nature of the "close" linkage of corruption to corporate
governance, that "[a] corrupt system influences corporate governance through its impact
on the calculus of crime and punishment, as well as on the credibility of the apparatus for
enforcing corporate rules, procedures and regulations.").
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA
This Article analyzes South Africa's corporate governance
reform discourse and its evolving corporate culture. These
initiatives in South Africa reflect critical issues and concepts in
comparative corporate law. While South Africa is sui generis,37 or
unique, the country demonstrates important lessons in governance
reform and contributes to scholarship of the same. The Article is
divided into five parts. Part II presents a brief overview of South
Africa designed to familiarize the reader with the "rainbow
nation." Part III is a background account of the nature and
character of the law of corporate governance in South Africa that,
besides definitions of the basic terms of the study, presents the
legal framework and characteristics of the law of corporate
governance in the country. Part IV analyzes the interactions of
domestic and external factors that are lending impetus to the
impending changes in the law of corporate governance in South
Africa. Part V develops an exhaustive survey of the literature on
the law of comparative corporate governance that integrates
discussion of the changing attention to Black Africa in the
scholarship. Part VI applies that scholarship to South Africa.
II. Refresher on the "Rainbow Nation"
South Africa is a large country, about twice the size of Texas,
located at the foot of Africa.38 With a population estimated at
about forty-three million people,39 South Africa ranks among the
most populous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, fourth after
Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
formerly Zaire,4 ° in that order. The population comprises
numerous racial and ethnic groups, evident in the twenty-two
37 The dictionary defines sui generis as "[b]eing the only example of its kind;
unique." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1358 (Houghton Mifflin Co.,
3d ed. 1993).
38 See F. JEFFRESS RAMSAY, GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA 158 (8th ed. 1999).
39 Peter J. Schraeder, South Africa: From the Shadows, in COMPARATIVE FOREIGN
POLICY: ADAPTATION STRATEGIES OF THE GREAT AND EMERGING POWERS 245, 265
(Steven W. Hook, ed., 2002). Out of forty three million people, three-quarters are black.
Id.
40 See RAMSAY, supra note 38, at 158, 52, 107, 81 (including general information
on these states, including population, with South Africa at 158, Nigeria at 52, Ethiopia at
107, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo at 81).
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official languages recognized in the country,4 and justifying the
appellation "the rainbow nation" applied to it.42  Although the
country's constitution provides for a unitary system of
government, the complexity of the country's rich diversity creates
a political framework that is "a hybrid governance structure with
strong powers vested in the central government and some federal
characteristics, with provinces having limited legislation-making
functions."43  Since the country's independence from Britain in
1910, a white minority held control of the reins of government and
denied blacks, who form the majority of the population, a voice
and opportunity for participation in the affairs of their own
country.44 The exclusion reached new heights in 1948 with the
41 Lucrecia Seafield, South Africa: The Interdependence of All Human Rights, in
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE FOR
OURSELVES 295, 295 (Abdullahi Ahmed An Na'im, ed., 2003). The major languages are
Afrikaans, English, Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho, Swati, Tsonga, Tswana, Venda, Xhosa, and
Zulu. RAMSAY, supra note 38, at 158.
42 The term was coined by the cleric Bishop Desmund Tutu, reputed for his
chairmanship of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), among other
initiatives in the struggle for black inclusiveness in the South African political system.
See Paul-Henri Bischoff & Roger Southall, The Early Foreign Policy of the Democratic
South Africa, in AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES 154, 159 (Stephen Wright, ed.) (1999);
NAOMI CHAZAN, ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 487 (Lynne
Rienner, 3rd ed., 1999) (regarding the TRC).
43 Seafield, supra note 41, at 295.
44 The black experience in South Africa invites comparison with that of blacks in
the United States over a century before. A key distinction is that in the United States in
1790 blacks formed the minority population, comprising only an estimated 18 percent of
the country, KENNETH JANDA ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT IN
AMERICA 75 (9th ed. 2008), whereas in South Africa, they were and have always been
the majority. Another point of distinction is that in the United States denial of national
citizenship to blacks was justified on the ground that they were brought involuntarily
into the country as slaves, whereas in South Africa, blacks were subjected to and endured
exclusion and segregation in their own homeland. There is an ingrained academic
tradition in the United States, embodied in the works of Professor Fredrickson and
former Judge Higginbotham and others, comparing the United States and South Africa.
See, e.g., GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, BLACK LIBERATION: A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF
BLACK IDEOLOGIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA (1995); GEORGE M.
FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMACY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN AMERICAN AND SOUTH
AFRICAN HISTORY (1981); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing
Segregation in the United States and South Africa: The Difficult Pursuit for Racial
Justice, 1990 U. IL. L. REV. 763 (1990); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American
and South African Courts: Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 491 (1990).
See also ANTHONY W. MARK, MAKING RACE AND NATION: A COMPARISON OF THE
UNITED STATES, SOUTH AFRICA, AND BRAZIL (1998) (going beyond the traditional two
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introduction of the policy and practice of apartheid (or apartness in
Afrikaans).n5
Led by the African National Congress (ANC), blacks resisted
their exclusion, first non-violently and when that failed, beginning
in 1961 and continuing through armed struggle until 1994 when
the policy of apartness ended with the inauguration and evolution
of majority rule in the country.' Important highlights of this
resistance include the adoption by the ANC and other opponents
of apartheid, of the Freedom Charter in 1955, which spelled out a
vision of a nonracial, democratic state for South Africa 47 and the
incarceration of Nelson Mandela, a known arrowhead and icon of
black resistance, by the white minority government for almost
three decades until his release in 1990. Following Mandela's
release from prison and the lifting of the ban the white minority
regime slapped upon the ANC and other parties who opposed
apartheid, South Africa, in 1993, adopted a "transitional"
constitution (to replace the apartheid era one of 1983), which was
superseded by the country's present constitution in 1996.48
countries to include Brazil).
45 Afrikaans is one of the major languages of the country. For more on apartheid,
see, e.g., CHAZAN, supra note 42, at 470-73; see also KAREN A. MINGST & MARGARET P.
KARNS, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 178-181 (Westview, 2d ed.,
2000) (discussing the international campaign against apartheid as a human rights issue
led by the United Nations).
46 See CHAZAN, ET AL., supra note 42, at 473-77. The year 1961 was the date the
ANC formed its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation in Zulu), on the
heels of the Sharpeville massacre of March 21, 1960, when South African security forces
used live ammunition against demonstrators protesting so-called "pass laws," limiting
the movement of nonwhites throughout South Africa. The attacks claimed the lives of 69
black people and left more than 180 injured. See Schraeder, supra note 39, at 249.
47 CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE, THE FREEDOM CHARTER (1955), reprinted in THE
COMMONWEALTH EMINENT PERSONS GROUP ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, MISSION TO SOUTH
AFRICA: THE COMMONWEALTH REPORT 157-161 (1986). The preamble of the document
stated, "we the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know:
that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government
can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people ..... Id. It also
indicated that "... we, the people of South Africa, black and white together- equals,
countrymen and brothers-adopt this Freedom Charter." Id. Finally, the charter stated
that the people of South Africa "pledge ourselves to strive together, sparing neither
strength nor courage, until the democratic changes set out here have been won." Id.
48 RAMSAY, supra note 38, at 159. Professors Theen and Wilson observed that
"one of the paradoxes of German history and politics is the fact that, although as a
people the Germans are very old, they have been a unified nation for a relatively brief
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
South Africa boasts one of the largest and most broad-based
economies in Africa.49 Once heavily dependent on the mining of
gold, diamonds, and other mineral resources, today, the South
African economy is more diversified with formal sectors based not
only on mining and agriculture, but also on manufacturing and
services.5 ° With an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of over
$130 billion, nearly 30 percent of Africa's economic output,51
South Africa is the only country in Sub-Saharah Africa with the
material potential to join the ranks of newly industrialized
countries now dominated by Asian countries like Hong Kong,
Malaysia, Singapore, and South Korea.12 For example, seven of
the eight African companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) are South African companies, four of which
deal with the mining industry,53 an occurrence reflecting the
continued influence of mining as a mainstay of the South African
economy even with diversification.
Yet in absolute terms, South Africa is not a rich country. With
a population approximately twice the size of Texas, South Africa's
economy is only half as large.54 Also, for the 25.6 million people
that make up its adult population, "the South African economy
only provides employment opportunities for 9.6 million people[,]"
period only." ROLF H.W. THEEN & FRANK L. WILSON, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SEVEN COUNTRIES 160 (3d ed. 1996). The same paradox arguably
afflicts South Africa. Although it has a national history that goes back more than one
hundred years counting from its independence in 1910, much longer using other
landmarks, it is still one of the youngest nations in Africa: it achieved majority rule only
in 1994. RAMSAY, supra note 38, at 159. This occurred four years after next-door
neighbor Namibia became independent. Id. at 156. Likewise, this occurred four decades
after Ghana, the first Black country to be decolonized, won its own independence in
1957. Id. at 36.
49 Seafield, supra note 41, at 295.
50 Id. See also Economy of South Africa, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Economy-ofSouthAfrica (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
51 Schraeder, supra note 39, at 246.
52 Bischoff& Southall, supra note 42, at 155.
53 Martha L. Salomon, Note, AIDS Is Risky Business: Examining the Effect of the
AIDS Crisis on Publicly Traded Companies in South Africa and the Implications for
Both South Africa and U.S. Investors, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1473, 1503 (2004).
54 Economy of South Africa, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
EconomyofSouth_Africa (last visited Jan. 26, 2008).
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leaving the rest, most of them blacks, structurally unemployed.5
Even more critical, the country's apparent economic prosperity
conceals the fact that, as one analyst aptly phrased it, "South
Africa is a country of vast extremes. 56  Vast disparities exist
between blacks and whites on every conceivable indicator,
including wealth, income, health, education, housing and land. 7
One report of the United Nations Development Program ranked
South Africa as the third most unequal country in the world,
surpassed only by Brazil and Guatemala.5 8 At 0.62, South Africa's
Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, is also among the
highest in the world. 9 In 1989, the estimated annual per capital
income of whites in the country was $4,775, compared to only
$417 for blacks. 60 The distribution of infrastructure in the country
follows a similar pattern, with white South Africans enjoying a
standard of living similar or equivalent to what one will find
among the most developed countries of the world, while blacks are
relegated to standards redolent of the least developed countries.6'
In short, South Africa "has a two-tiered economy; one rivaling
other developed countries and the other with only the most basic
infrastructure" of the kind associated with least developed
societies, making the country "a productive and industrialized
economy that exhibits many characteristics associated with
55 Seafield, supra note 41, at 295. For more on this challenge, see infra nn. 64-68,
and accompanying text.
56 Seafield, supra note 41, at 295. An example is the health care industry: "[iln
1992, infant mortality for [black South] Africans was eight to ten times higher than that
for whites and was significantly higher than rates in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Botswana."
Tuberculosis, a disease that generally tracks poverty, "struck 780 of 10,000 black [South]
Africans, compared with only 13.5 of 10,000 white[] [South Africans]." See CHAZAN ET
AL., supra note 42, at 486.
57 True to its notoriety as a land "of vast extremes," South Africa combines, as a
U.S. analyst points out, "sophisticated publicly listed companies," some of which trade
their stocks in the New York Stock Exchange, with "an extremely high AIDS prevalence
rate among [its] general population[.]" Salomon, supra note 53, at 1504. For more on
HIV/AIDS in the country, see infra note 69 and accompanying text.
58 Seafield, supra note 41, at 295.
59 Servaas Van Ber Berg, Consolidating South African Democracy: The Political
Arithmetic of Budgetary Redistribution, 97 AFR. AFF. 255 (1998).
60 See CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 485.
61 See Seafield, supra note 41, at 295.
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developing countries .... ,,62 This contrast between First and Third
Worlds, a legacy of apartheid, "is one of South Africa's most
striking features. 63 While remarkable progress hard to minimize
has been made since the onset of majority rule in 1994, much still
remains to be done to bridge the gulf of disparity between white
and black South Africans. Unemployment of a size that dwarfs
the Great Depression still afflicts blacks.64 More than whites,
blacks are also unlikely to possess the education and skills that
lead to steady or fulfilling employment.65 Of the more than three
million South Africans with no formal education at all, 90 percent
are black.66 The result of this unequal access to education for
blacks is a skills shortage so acute that some corporations, such as
the liquid fuel company Sasol, had to import pipe-welders from
Thailand.67 Everywhere in the country, "[t]he great constraint
holding back development.., is the lack of skilled workforce. 68
Tracking and compounding these problems are recent
challenges, including HIV/AIDS, an "epidemic of shattering
62 Economy of South Africa, supra note 50.
63 Seafield, supra note 41, at 295.
64 See CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 487 (noting that in 1996 "as many as 55
percent of young black males were unemployed"); Schraeder, supra note 39, at 264, 265
(quoting the variant figures of 45 percent and 35 percent). The rate of unemployment in
the U.S. during the Great Depression, beginning in 1932, was about 25 percent,
excluding millions of underemployed people. JANDA ET AL., supra note 44, at 590.
Added to this and complicating matters is the impoverished condition of the historically
neglected black townships. About eight million South Africans, especially people living
in the black townships, still lack access to running water and three million citizens lack
adequate housing. See Schraeder, supra note 39, at 265; Alec Russell, Mbeki Vows to
Increase Police Force in Focus on Crime, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 10, 2007, at 2.
Sixty-eight percent of South Africa's rural population, most of which is black, lives in
abject poverty. Seafield, supra note 41, at 296.
65 Seafield, supra note 41, at 295-296.
66 Id. at 296.
67 See Alec Russell, Dire Skills Shortage Mars Freedom Anniversary Party in
South Africa, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 26, 2007, at 10.
68 Id.; See also Alec Russell, Interview with Fin. Minister Trevor Manuel: Caution
in a Commodity Boom Climate, FIN. TIMES (London), June 5, 2007, (Fin. Times Special
Rep. on S. Afr.) at 4 ("If you say we don't produce sufficient rocket scientists we don't
need to spend too much time talking about that. But the country also has huge deficits in
artisanal skills .... If you are building refineries you can't just take people off the
streets, give them a welding machine or an oxyacetylene torch and say 'weld the
pipes."').
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dimensions" which affects every facet of life, including business,69
and an exceptionally high crime rate.70 A ten-year review in 2004
of the post-apartheid period found the persistence of "two
economies" in the country.7 1 One of the tools the South African
government has used to correct the disparity resulting from its
apartheid past and promote inclusiveness is the Black Economic
72 7Empowerment initiative. Known as the BEE Act,73 the law
69 See Salomon, supra note 53, at 1477. See also Catholic Relief Services (CRS),
South Africa, http://www.crs.org/our-work/where-we-work/overseas/Africa/
southafrica/index.cfm (last visited March 20, 2006) ("South Africa has an estimated
five million people living with HIV/AIDS. There are more people infected with
HIV/AIDS in South Africa than in any other country in the world."). According to CRS,
South Africa is home to an estimated 660,000 children under 15 who have been
orphaned because of AIDS. Id. In the mining, metals processing, and agribusiness
industries, where more than 23 percent of workers suffer from AIDS, the cost of labor
has risen dramatically because of an increase in absenteeism and employee turnover as a
result of the epidemic. See Salomon, supra note 53, at 1503. As one U.S. analyst
pointed out, given that the mines depend primarily on a workforce derived from a
particularly high-risk segment of the population, AIDS is particularly relevant for U.S.
investors in these companies whose stocks are listed in the New York Stock Exchange.
Id.
70 With about 18,000 murders a year or nearly more than ten times the number in
the United States, South Africa dubiously boasts one of the highest violent crime rates in
the world. See, e.g., Schrader, supra note 39, at 265; Russell, supra note 64. Thoughtful
commentators have warned that violent crimes could, if not curbed, pose a threat to post-
apartheid South Africa, and overshadow the economic accomplishments of the ANC
government. One analyst wrote, "As South Africans know all too well from the apartheid
era, international perceptions are crucial to their hopes of success. The outriders of the
big private equity groups eyeing potential investments may not in these 'good times' be
put off by the murder rate. But the drip-drip of bad news will, in the long run, take its
toll." Alec Russell, Pretoria Must Take the Crime Crisis Seriously, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 6, 2007, at 13. Pointing to the relationship between economic development and
human rights, one South African human rights practitioner correctly noted that "[t]he
improvement of the economy is a sine qua non for the effective exercise and promotion
of human rights." Seafield, supra note 41, at 336. The same writer observed that "[t]he
increase in crime has resulted in a backlash against the constitution; people are now
blaming the ills of society on the bill of rights and are calling for the reinstatement of
capital punishment[,]" and advised: "[a] balancing act between the dictates of the
constitution and being tough on crime is required." Id. In response to this problem, the
Mbeki government intends to increase the police force in South Africa from 152,000 to
180,000 troops. Russell, supra note 64. The government has also "called for more
community policing and better regulation of the private security industry." Id.
71 Infra note 182 and accompanying text; supra note 62 and accompanying text.
72 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 14 & 51 n. 11.
73 Id. Some of the assumptions underlying adoption of the BEE Act are that
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culminated the promise of the ANC government upon taking
office in 1994 to eradicate all forms of discrimination, wherever it
existed,74  and the publication of the Reconstruction and
Development Program (RDP), a broad-based measure designed to
correct the exclusion of blacks and bring them into the economic
mainstream.75 A variety of other legislative measures have since
been enacted to complement the BEE Act. 76  Both the private
sector in South Africa and the South African Constitution approve
preferential measures for blacks,77 and South African legal
"economic unity" in South Africa requires the inclusion of blacks, long excluded as a
group for no reason other than their race or color, be integrated into the economic
mainstream; that race/color is a legitimate tool for achieving that integration; that South
Africa performs below its potential because of the low level of income earned and
generated by the majority of its people; and that unless steps are taken to increase the
effective participation of the majority of South Africans in the economy, the stability and
prosperity of the economy in the future may be undermined to the detriment of all South
Africans, irrespective of race. Id.
74 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 112.
75 Some of the objectives of the RDP are "to de-racialize" business ownership and
control in South Africa through "focused policies" of assistance to blacks designed "to
make it easier for [them] to gain access to capital for business development," and
"ensur[ing] that no discrimination occurs in financial institutions." Id. (quoting
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME DOCUMENT para. 4.4.6.3).
76 See id. at 112-113. These initiatives include the Employment Equity Act 55 of
1998, which required companies to develop an employment equity plan and to report on
progress in achieving the objectives set out in their plans, as well as the Skills
Development Act 97 of 1998, and the Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999, both of
which govern the provision of resources for skills development and training by
companies. Id. at 113, nn. 125-26.
77 With respect to the private sector, the King Report of 1994 assessed adoption of
affirmative action measures by companies to be good corporate-governance practice and
dedicated a whole chapter, Chapter 8, to affirmative action. Id. at 113, 113 n. 120. King
H (2002) did the same thing, expressing in its final report the view that taking into
account the "social imbalances" that have existed in South Africa for many decades and
the need for reform, among other factors, companies need "a greater social and ethical
conscience" in the interest of their long-term survival as well as "the greater well-being
of society generally." Id. at 113 (citing KING COMM., KING REPORT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA § 4, ch. 5, para. I). The report also admonished South
African companies to make themselves "seen as agents of change not only for their own
benefit but also for the benefit of their stakeholders." Id. Regarding constitutional
protection, the interim Constitution provided for affirmative action as an integral part of
the right to equality. The document forbids any person from being "unfairly
discriminated against" on grounds that include race, gender, sex, and language, but also
stipulated that the provision should "not preclude measures designed to achieve the
adequate protection and advancement of persons or groups or categories of persons
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scholars, such as Mongalo, contend that such measures are good
corporate-governance practices that should form a necessary and
integral part of a reformed law of corporate governance in South
Africa.78 However, like in the United States, these affirmative
action measures remain controversial.79 Critics complain that the
policy and its accompanying programs are a tool ANC politicians
use to provide "jobs for the boys,"8° and the government,
responding to these complaints, has moved to streamline or
reshape the measures which it recently renamed "broad-based
black economic empowerment. '81  Reinforcing its controversial
nature, the BEE Act also recently became the subject of
international litigation.82  One thoughtful South African
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in order to enable their full and equal enjoyment
of all rights and freedoms." See id. at 113 (INTERIM CONST. OF S. AFR. §§8(2) and (3)).
The language of the document suggests preferential measures also apply to white
women. The final Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, echoed the provisions of the interim
Constitution on this very subject matter. Id. at 113.
78 Id. at 112. Besides recognizing South Africa's peculiar circumstances,
affirmative action measures, such as the BEE Act, speak to the inadequacy of a focus on
conventional corporate law principles in the South African setting. Id. at 114-115.
Mongalo argued that the conventional rules, coupled with apartheid laws, enabled South
African companies to embark on an exclusive corporate approach focused on
shareholders that now needs to change. Id. at 114. He said the dismantling of apartheid
has served to reveal the shibboleths of the exclusive shareholder supremacy at all costs
approach and brought with it the realization that companies do not operate in a vacuum.
Id. Mongalo welcomes the innovation represented by the King Reports, see infra nn.
185-193 and accompanying texts, with their notion of a "triple-bottom-line" approach to
corporate governance that goes beyond the single bottom-line of profit for shareholders,
but indicated they did not go far enough, given that these reports "ignor[ed] calls for a
more explicit recognition of the role of stakeholders within corporate law." Id. at 115.
79 Alec Russell, Black Economic Empowerment: Anxious to Shed a "Jobs for the
Boys" Perception, FIN. TIMES (London), June 5, 2007, (Fin. Times Special Rep. on S.
Afr.) at 4. Regarding affirmative action in America, see e.g., Philip C. Aka, The
Supreme Court and Affirmative Action in Public Education, with Special Reference to
the Michigan Cases, 2006 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 1 (2006), passim.
80 Alec Russell, Black Economic Empowerment: Anxious to Shed a "Jobs for the
Boys" Perception, FIN. TIMES (London), June 5, 2007, (FIN. TIMES Special Rep. on S.
Afr.) at 4; See also Alec Russell & Lionel Barber, Call to Reform Black Empowerment
Rule, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 10, 2007, at 9.
81 See Russell & Barber, supra note 80.
82 In a case that signifies the growing power of international law in governing trade
and investment, three Italian mining companies, Marlin Holdings, Marlin Corp., and
RED Graniti SA, have filed an arbitration suit with the International Center for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington D.C. (housed with the World
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commenting in 1993 on the folly of expectation of a quick move
toward liberal democracy in South Africa, stated, "[a]nyone who
thought we would be able to change [three hundred] years of white
domination and [forty-five] years of apartheid into a liberal
democracy in a flash and without releasing considerable energy
was naive., 83 Like with the dismantle of apartheid, the disparities
of the apartheid era will take some time, quite a lot of hard work
and some luck to fix.
84
Economic factors play a major role in the shaping of the
foreign relations of post-apartheid South Africa.85 In an attempt to
overcome the extraordinary challenges they confront, South Africa
governments, especially the market-friendly administration of
Thabo Mbeki, "ha[ve] aggressively sought foreign aid, trade, and
investment. ' '86  The economic orientation of South African post-
apartheid foreign policy is indicated by the prominent role the
Department of Trade and Industry has played in the foreign affairs
of the country, a role that has loomed so large that a suggestion
has been made for the merger of the department with the
Department of Foreign Affairs "to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic
competition and to ensure a more integrated foreign-policy
Bank) against the South African government, alleging that South Africa's new minerals
law, enacted pursuant to the BEE Act, violated investment protection treaties the South
African government signed with Italy and other foreign governments. The companies
seek compensation in the amount of $350 million for what they allege as the
expropriation of their granite mining operations. See Luke Peterson & Alan Beattie,
Mining Trio Mount Court Challenge to South Africa, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 9, 2007,
at 8. An occurrence that complicates matters for the black-led government in South
Africa is that, during the 1990s, "in an attempt to placate nervous foreign investors," it
signed "a series of bilateral treaties" with a diversity of foreign governments that include
Italy, the country of incorporation of the companies bringing this claim, making
guarantees in return for investments that it must still keep without violating its own laws,
here symbolized by the BEE Act. Id.
83 See CHANZAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 477.
84 Id.
85 See Schraeder, supra note 39, at 245 passim.
86 Id. at 264. Recognition among the leadership in South Africa "that foreign
capital is crucial to internal reconstruction and development has made South Africa a
firm proponent of the neoliberal model of development," a world view "which rejects the
once-heralded models of import substitution, trade protectionism, and government
control of key industries." Id. at 265. Professor Schraeder views this occurrence as a
"surprising development[] in South African foreign policy since the apartheid era." Id.
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approach.
III. Nature and Character of the Law of Corporate
Governance in South Africa
A. Defining Corporate Governance
The key to a proper understanding of the concept of corporate
governance is to understand two terms: corporate law and
corporate finance.88 Corporate law "recognizes, as a formal
matter, three different groups: shareholders, directors, and officers.
Corporate law gives each of these groups certain rights and
imposes certain obligations with respect to the operation of the
enterprise. It also regulates the distribution of rights and duties
between the three groups."8 9 More to the point for our purpose
here, corporate law is essentially concerned with creation and or
availability of the corporate form for two primary purposes,
namely: (1) to facilitate and regulate the process of raising capital
for the business operations of a company (corporate finance), and
(2) to impose controls on persons whose power is derived from the
finance that the use of the corporate form has put at their disposal
or regulating organs concerned with the governance of a company
87 Schraeder, supra note 39, at 261; Bischoff & Southall, supra note 42, at 159.
88 We could even back off one step by beginning our definitional journey with
corporation. Corporations are "an ancient device of intangible organization" that, since
the 19th century, have provided a "convenient foundation" and "an efficient means" for
aggregating resources and a "large-scale organ [] for" producing wealth. LARRY CATA
BACKER, COMPARATIVE CORPORATE LAW: UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN UNION, CHINA
AND JAPAN: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (2002). See also Charles R. P. Pouncy, Stock
Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Western Legal Institutions as a Component of the Neo-
Colonial Project, 23 U. PA. J. INT' L. 85, 90 n.17 (Spring 2002) ("Innovations in the
structure of business organizations were important if large-scale risk-taking ventures
were to become practical. The consequences of being a co-owner of a failed partnership,
which could include being imprisoned or sold into slavery to satisfy one's debts,
provided a strong incentive for the creation of alternative organizations in which
personal liability could be limited."). Five attributes of a corporation recognized by the
law of corporation are (1) limited liability, the quality most commonly associated with
the corporate form, (2) free transferability of ownership interests, (3) continuity of
existence or "perpetual life," (4) centralized management, and (5) entity status. MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 100 (8th ed. 2000).
89 BACKER, supra note 88, at 176.
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(corporate governance). 9° Stated differently, the nature of the
inter-relationship among shareholders, directors, and officers is
that issues of corporate law could be categorized into two areas:
corporate finance law, and corporate governance. 9'
Corporate finance law deals with the way in which a company
raises money for its business operations and how the company
deals with its finances generally.92 Issues involved in the law of
corporate finance include incorporating and commencing a
business, corporate personality and its significance in corporate
finance, pre-incorporation contracts and their significance in
financing business activities, shares and share capital, rights
attaching to shares, distributions to shareholders, share buy-backs
and redeemable shares.93 By comparison, corporate governance
focuses mainly on the systems by which companies are directed
and controlled.94  It is "the collection of law and practice[s],"
"grounded in fiduciary duties and their application[,]" "that
regulates the conduct of those in control" of a corporation, 95 and
the means through which a variety of countries provide a legal
basis for corporations "while preserving, to some extent, authority
to control abuses of' these business organizations. 96  Issues
involved in the law and study of corporate governance include
formation and dissolution of companies, financing, structures such
as board of directors and shareholders, the importance of the
corporate constitution, duties and responsibilities of those
controlling companies, the importance of company meetings,
90 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 100 (citing EiLis FERRAN, COMPANY LAW AND




94 Id. The link between the two terms, as the South African legal scholar,
Mongalo, said, can be explained by posing the question: "Given that a company has been
enabled by company law rules relating to corporate finance to raise capital, are the
controllers of the company (directors, shareholders and other stakeholders) subject to
effective regulation . . . to ensure that they act as stewards of the company's assets? If
there are such rules . . . [wihat are these rules? Are they effective or do they need to be
bolstered? This is the core of corporate governance." Id.
95 BACKER, supra note 88, at 3. Features of a corporation also include provisions
commonly contained in charters and similar documents or custom, such as the manner of
calling and holding meetings, qualifications for office, and so forth. Id.
96 BACKER, supra note 88, at 3.
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protection of minorities within companies, and insider trading and
its importance in corporate governance.97 Sources of corporate
governance law include statutes, cases, and government or stock
rules. These sources could also encompass securities law
(focusing on both the selling of and the market for securities).98
Other factors beyond corporate law which can influence corporate
governance include banking, tax, labor, and bankruptcy laws.99
Given the critical nature of law enforcement in this, as in other
areas, issues of criminal and civil litigation also arise in the
corporate setting.'0° Finally, as South Africa exemplifies, the law
of corporate governance can go beyond conventional instruments
to include codes that complement or serve as substitutes for the
legal protection afforded by conventional techniques.10' A
cautionary note that goes both to the conceptual limitation of
corporate governance and to its connection with broader forces of
governance in a society beyond the corporate arena is that
''corporate governance is one piece of the complex puzzle of what
makes" both the economy and political system of a country
work. 102
B. Legal Framework Relating to the Law of Corporate
Governance in South Africa
Much of the regime of South African corporate law originated
in the United Kingdom; although certain aspects of the African
country's corporate law are either home-grown or inherited from
the Roman-Dutch tradition, much of that law has its origins in the
United Kingdom, especially the Joint Stock Act of 1856 and
related legislation.'0 3 Company law in South Africa may be
conveniently divided into two eras or periods, namely, (1) the
97 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 100; Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of
Comparative Corporate Governance, 23 W. INT'L L.J. 477, 484 n. 23 (2005).
98 Pinto, supra note 97, at 484 n.23
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Pinto, supra note 97, at 484, n.23; see also infra nn. 185-193 and accompanying
texts (discussing the King Reports and the Code accompanying the second King Report).
102 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 503.
103 See Mongalo, supra note 2, at 93-94, 99.
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period before 1910, and (2) the period since 1910.4 Before 1910,
a notable applicable law is the Joint Stock Companies Limited
Liabilities Act No. 23 of 1861 of the Cape Colony.'°5 As its name
implicates, the provincial legislation did not embrace a unified
South Africa. Along with other provincial company legislation of
the period, the law was patterned on English law. 10 6 In fact, as the
South African commentator and practitioner on corporate reforms
Mongalo pointed out, until the enactment of the 1973 law, the
general legislative policy in South Africa was "to follow the
example set in England."'
10 7
Post-1910, the relevant or applicable laws are (1) the Union
Companies Act No. 46 of 1926, and (2) the Companies Act No. 61
of 1973, which together constitute the main sources of law on
companies in South Africa.10 8  As its name implies, the 1926 law
was South Africa's first national company law. It was patterned
on the English Companies (Consolidation) Act of 1908 which, in
turn, was based on the Joint Stock Acts of 1844 and 1956.109 The
104 Recall that 1910 is the year South Africa secured its freedom from Britain, a
"national" independence limited only to whites. See supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
105 See GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 12.
106 Id. at 12 (describing the law as "a carbon copy of equivalent English
legislation").
107 See Mongalo, supra note 2, at 94. Even the Companies Act of 1973, infra nn.
110-14, retained influence of English law. Id. Although an extensive reform that is said
to "effectively cut the umbilical cord between English and South African company law,"
the law still embodied provisions borrowed from English law. Id. at 94, 94, n.11.
Moreover, "decisions of the higher English courts on similar English Companies Acts"
were still accorded "persuasive authority of great weight" by South African courts, even
though those decisions had no binding effect. Id. at 94. This is equally so with respect
to English common-law doctrines which remained relevant and continued to be applied
in South African courts. Id. Examples here are common-law corporate governance
principles, such as those relating to the duties of directors, that are still un-codified. Id.
108 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 12. A law that,
although not strictly part of the regime of South African company law, deserves some
quick mention is the Close Corporations Act No. 69 of 1984. Id. The law regulates
close corporations, introduced in South Africa in 1985. Id. See also Mongalo, supra
note 2, at 98. Its "purpose was to provide a simple, inexpensive business entity offering
limited liability for a single person enterprise or one involving a small number of
persons." Id. The legislation was "inspired by an English policy document
recommending the introduction of a new form of incorporation for small companies
which, ironically, was never implemented in the United Kingdom." Id.
109 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 94.
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Companies Act of 1973 replaced the 1926 Act. One of the most
important provisions of the 1973 law is Section 18 mandating the
establishment of a Standing Advisory Committee on Company
Law charged with the task of making recommendations from time
to time regarding the amendment of the Act. I° The Committee's
establishment was the result of the recommendation of the Van
Wyk de Vries Commission,"' which reviewed the 1926 law.1 12
The Commission began its work in 1963 and published its main
report in 1970 and a supplementary report, accompanied with a
draft bill, in 1972.' l3 The companies law of 1973 became the
monument of that review.' 14 Although short of an actual overhaul,
the work of the Van Wyk de Vries Commission represented a
major review of South African corporate governance law leading
to 1973.'5 Another incomprehensive change short of an actual
overhaul in the post-1973 period is the Securities Regulation Panel
of 1989 designed to regulate takeovers and changes of control in a
company.' 16
Two other necessary elements complete the legal framework
of South African law before 2007. The first consists of the
common law relating to the formation, maintenance, and death of
corporate entities."' The second consists of the organizations
responsible for enforcement of corporate law in South Africa." 8
Besides, not surprisingly, the Department of Trade and Industry,
these organizations include the Johannesburg Securities Exchange
(JSE), the Financial Services Board, and the Director of Public
Prosecutions.1 9 The proposed revision seeks to "address the
110 See id. at 98 & 98 n. 38.
111 Id. at 98 n.38. The commission is named for chairman Justice Van Wyk de
Vries. Id. at 96 n.33. For the charge or terms of reference of the Commission, see id.
112 Id. at 96-97.
113 See id.at 96-97 & 96 n.33.
114 Id. at96.
115 Id.
116 See GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 12.
117 ld. at 9-10.
118 Seeid. at 10.
119 Id. at 10. Established in 1887 before South Africa became a nation, the JSE,
known in full as JSE Securities Exchange South Africa, used to be called the
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). JSE Corporate Identity,
http://www.jse.co.za/history-corporate-id.jsp (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). The
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institutional requirements to ensure simplicity and effective and
consistent enforcement" relating to corporate offenses, and to
clarify the roles and responsibilities of these enforcing bodies. 0
C. Features of the Law of Corporate Governance in South
Africa
Publicly-held corporations are one of several business
associations in South Africa. The others are partnerships, business
trusts, and close corporations. Companies, especially those with a
share capital, form the business entity that dominates economic
life in South Africa. Also, corporations generate enormous
revenues that contribute substantially to the country's gross
domestic product (GDP).' 21  "By size of operations, market
capitalization and number of employees," publicly-held or listed
companies, are massive organizations with resources that begin
sometimes to match those of a country. 2 2 These are among the
factors that make corporate law central to the economy of South
Africa and its prosperity and fundamental to its commercial
competitiveness. The same factors also necessitate urgent reform
of the country's corporate governance by the Department of Trade
and Industry. 123 As Mongalo said, South Africa needs a new
company law "which is up-to-date, competitive and designed to
cater to the modern corporation which is not only a domestic
force, but also an international competitor."'' 2
4
As a result of international sanctions imposed upon South
Africa during the apartheid era, the corporate ownership model
that prevailed in the country appeared to be one involving a
concentration of power within the hands of only a few individuals
and companies. 2 1 With foreign investment into the country down
to only a trickle, "the biggest South African businesses became
organization adopted its new name effective from Nov. 8, 2000, but retained its old
acronym to minimize confusion. Id.
120 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 10.
121 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 95.
122 Id.
123 See id.
124 Id. at 97.
125 See id.
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nests of complex cross-holdings."' 2 6 As a result, by the end of
2000, South Africa had 608 companies listed on the main board of
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 127  Of that number, 390,
comprising nearly two-thirds of all listed companies, had a
shareholder holding more than 30 percent, meaning that there was
still a considerable number of companies with a substantial
shareholding concentrated in single investors or only a few. 128
However, the majority of listed companies did not have a
shareholder who clearly wielded legal control. 129  Instead,
companies with a shareholder(s) controlling 50 percent or more of
the shares amounted to a mere 190, or a fewer than a third of all
listed companies. 3 ° Moreover, most of the shareholders with
more than 50 percent shareholding in listed companies within the
same period were institutional, not individual or family,
shareholders.13' What can one make of these corporate ownership
statistics? 132 Mongalo's take is that the dispersed and concentrated
ownership models "operat[e] side by side" in South Africa. 133 The
consequence of reform of corporate governance in the country, he
said, is that both problems, namely, strengthening managerial
accountability standard with respect to the dispersed model and
protecting the interests of minority shareholders with respect to the
concentrated model, require urgent attention. 134
There are two regimes relating to the law of corporate
governance in South Africa. 135 The first consists of conventional
corporate governance principles made up of (a) company
legislation, such as the Companies Acts of 1926 and 1973, (b)
126 Id. at 111.
127 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 111.
128 See id.
129 Legal control is defined here as having more than 50 percent of the
shareholdings. Id. at 110.
130 See id.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 110-1].
133 Mongalo, supra note 2, at I11.
134 See id. Mongalo said the King Committee missed this assessment because it
presumed that dispersed ownership was the model in South Africa leading it to see
improvement of managerial accountability as the problem needing solution. See infra
notes 185-193 and accompanying texts.
135 See Mongalo, supra note 2, at 101.
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articles of associations of companies, and (c) the common law. 136
The principles of corporate governance under this regime are
enforceable either by terms of the common law or pursuant to
statutory provisions.'37 To use action for a breach of fiduciary
duties as example, shareholders or the company could sue the
wrongdoer(s) under a common law derivative action or under the
derivative action rule provided by section 266 of the Companies
Act of 1973. '38 The second regime is a new system embodied in
codes of good practice.'3 9 Known also as the "code" or self-
regulatory system of corporate governance, this regime is designed
to enhance and modernize the rules and principles of conventional
corporate governance to reflect the context of the modem
environment within which companies operate.' 40 The reason this
regime is denominated "code" or self-regulatory is that it lacks a
legal basis for enforcement. 14' "Its purpose is to impose stricter
checks and balances to curb malpractice or wrongdoing by those
engaged in corporate decision making."'142  This new regime
"merely restate[s]... in an enhanced manner, principles found in
traditional [South African] corporate governance."' 43  It is a
regime borne out of reviews undertaken by panels established by
the private sector as was the case in the United Kingdom.' 44 In
South Africa, these reviews took the form of the King Reports,
with an accompanying Code of Corporate Practices and
Conduct, 145 each of which incorporated new standards on
corporate governance.146 With this new regime, South Africa now
has "many corporate governance principles," old and new, "which
may be legally enforced in [its] courts of law."' ' 47
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 101.
139 See id.
140 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 101.
141 Id.
142 Id.
"43 Id. at 102.
144 Id.
145 See infra notes 185-193 and accompanying texts.
146 See Mongalo, supra note 2, at 102.
147 Id.
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South Africa has witnessed a steady growth in corporate
development since the onset of majority government in the
country in 1994.148 For the ten-year period between March of
1996 and March of 2006, corporate registrations in the country
grew phenomenally, from 518,000 to 1.8 million registrations.
149
This growth occurred because corporations that strove to survive
in the era of sanctions against apartheid, have developed a
different mindset-in favor of paying. 5 ° The Revenue Service
Department's policy of "pay now and argue later" was approved
by the Constitutional Court, sending the message, which
corporations understood, that the administration must be taken
seriously. 151
IV. Impetus for Reform of Corporate Governance Law in
South Africa
This section continues and builds on the discussion in the
introduction of the Article 52 but focuses on the impetuses for
reform of South Africa's corporate governance law. The
Guidelines on Corporate Law Reform released by the Department
of Trade and Industry articulated three interrelated impetuses that
collectively form the need for the overhaul of the law of corporate
governance in South Africa. 153 The DTI seeks to accomplish: (1) a
changing environment, (2) a new constitutional dispensation, and
(3) the imperativeness of modernization. 154  Regarding the first,
148 See Alec Russell, Tax Activist Fills South Africa's Coffers, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 24-25, 2007, at 4.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 3.
151 Id.
152 See supra nn. 3-26 and accompanying texts.
153 Id.
154 See generally GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 13-17.
A fourth impetus in the policy document not given attention here is the treatment of non-
profit organizations and cooperatives, which, in my assessment, is integral to impetus
number three, relating to the necessity for modernization. These businesses, estimated to
number about 11,000, are called section 21 companies, after the section of the 1973 Act
that provides for them. The report suggests that "specific provisions" be made for these
business entities "when reforming the Companies Act to ensure that these types of
companies are not faced with the same requirements regarding share capital, but still
comply with principles of sound governance, accountability[,] and the protection of
creditors." Id. at 18.
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the policy paper enumerated factors within and outside South
Africa that "have contributed to fundamental changes in the
environment in which business operates,"' 55 and "highlighted the
need for domestic laws to be investor friendly and competitive
with international trends."' 15 6  These factors include "greater
globalization, increased electronic communication, greater
sensitivity to social and ethical concerns, fast changing markets,
greater competition for capital, goods and services," and "mobility
of international capital."' 57 South Africa simply cannot afford to
stand immobile while the world around it, domestically as well as
internationally, is moving.'58
The second impetus revolved around "fundamental legal
developments" in South Africa since the Companies Act of 1973,
the most important of which was the adoption of the post-
apartheid Constitution of 1996.' Given the status accorded the
Constitution as "the supreme law of the country," "[n]o area of
South African law can be analyzed or evaluated without recourse
to the" document. 160 Embedded in this same document, under its
Chapter 2, is a Bill of Rights that, because it "enshrines the rights
of all people in the country and affirms the democratic values of
human dignity, equality and freedom," forms "a cornerstone of
democracy in South Africa."'' The Constitution and the
principles it espouses are then reflected in the policies and
legislative programs that have taken place since 1994, such as
environmental regulation and affirmative action laws, like the
BEE Act, designed to promote inclusion for blacks. 162 Briefly, the
company law the policy paper formulates and proposes will be
"consistent not only with the Constitution of South Africa and the
principles of equality and fairness that it enshrines, but also with
other laws" that go beyond the economic concerns of shareholders
155 Id. at 14.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 13.
158 See id.
159 Id. at 14.
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to promote the broader interests of society. 163
The third and final impetus articulated in the DTI policy paper
is the necessity for modernization of the current corporate law
regime that includes corporations. 64 The goal is a "company law,
which is up-to-date, competitive and designed for a modem
corporation that is not only a domestic institution operating in a
new environment but also an international competitor[,]' 65 with
"[c]areful consideration" paid to "developments and best practices
internationally," while keeping also in mind the local context and
peculiarities of South Africa. 166  This last impetus is tied to or
directed at two main problems. The first is that the existing
regime is full of "highly formalistic," and "economically
unrealistic" rules, that "mak[e] it burdensome and costly to form
and manage an enterprise."' 67 These rules may also, "encourage
sham compliance with provisions.,,168 This must be changed to
afford South African businesses the flexibility they need "to raise
capital in a global environment that requires responsiveness and
innovation."' 6 9 Some of the important areas of attention include
the rules governing the duties and liabilities of directors now
"largely left to common law and Codes of Corporate Practice[,]' 170
and the administration of corporate governance rules, under the
current law marked by a "lack of enforcement and recourse."'
7 1
163 See id.
164 See id. at 15.
165 Id. at 6. The policy paper reminds the reader "to take into account that these
days many companies are global and operate in many economies and jurisdictions, not
only that of South Africa." Id.
166 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 11; see also id. at 5
(disclosing that the decision of the South African government "to review and modernize
company law in [the] country was based on the need to bring our law in line with
international trends and to reflect and accommodate the changing environment for
business, both in South Africa and globally.").
167 See id. at 15, 16.
168 Id. at 15.
169 Id. at 16-17.
170 Id. at 16.
171 Id. at 17. The DTI policy paper does not put all the blame for lack of
enforcement on corporate law. Instead, it says, the problem is partially "attributable to
the disincentives to litigation created by the court system, such as the under-developed
nature of class actions and contingency fees and the costs of protracted litigation ..." Id.
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The second main problem is that, except for the mini-review
represented by the Van Wyk De Vries Commission,172 no
comprehensive reform of the outdated and outmoded legal
framework "built on foundations, which were put in place in
Victorian England in the middle of the nineteenth century[J" 173has
taken place, when a broad range of countries or jurisdictions
within and beyond Africa, including Australia, Botswana, Canada,
Hong Kong, and the United Kingdom, "have undertaken extensive
reviews of their domestic company law." 174 Indeed, "[d]uring the
same period, a series of spectacular corporate failures have
focused attention upon the need for improved corporate
governance in many countries, not the least being the USA, which
has recently passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act."'175 South Africa has
also had its own share of failures represented by the collapse of
companies like Leisurenet and Regal Bank. 76 The net effect of
such occurrences has been that "investor confidence around the
world, and particularly in the U.S., has been badly shaken by
events at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia, Vivendi[,] and
Parmalat, to name but a few.... [T]he actions of a small number of
people have had immense repercussions on the whole business
community. ' 1
7
An overarching factor around which, for the DTI, these
various factors coalesce is the importance of good corporate
governance for the South African economy. 178 "Corporations, in
various forms, are central to [the] country's economy and its
prosperity," in that they are tools "for wealth creation and social
renewal." '179 A company law regime that is "clear, facilitating,
predictable and consistently enforced" can "create a protective and
172 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 7.
173 Id. at 5.
174 Id. at 7, n.2. There can be no good reason for South Africa to resist change, the
DTI counseled, at a time when "the framework upon which our company legislation is
based has been questioned in the land of its origin," pointing out that the review of core
company law in Britain resulted in the publication of a report in July 2002. Id. at 5.
175 Id. at 7.
176 Salomon, supra note 53, at 1486.
177 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 10-11.
178 See id. at 8.
179 Id. at 5.
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fertile environment for economic activity..., ' 180 Accordingly, the
DTI prescribes the five steps, summarized in the policy paper, that
it designed to promote the competitiveness and development of the
South African economy using company law. 18 ' The contribution
of corporate governance to economic development becomes
particularly urgent considering the fact that despite the vision of
the government and the magnificent strides achieved in the post-
apartheid period, one review on the first ten years of majority rule
found that the country continues to be saddled by "two
economies." This review elaborated as follows:
The first is an advanced, sophisticated economy based on skilled
labor, which is becoming more globally competitive. The
second is a mainly informal, marginalized, unskilled economy,
populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the
formal sector. Despite the impressive gains made in the first
economy, the benefits of growth have yet to reach the second
economy, and with the enormity of the challenges arising from
the social transition, the second economy risks falling further
behind if there is no decisive government intervention. 182
One of several corporate governance events in South Africa
that the policy paper indicated preceded and culminated the review
it proposed was the publication of the second King Report on
Corporate Governance in South Africa. 183  The King Report on
Corporate Governance (King I),184 released in 1994, broke new
ground in corporate governance at the time it was published: it
formalized the need for companies to recognize they no longer
operated independently from the societies in which they operate
by advocating an integrated approach to good governance that
180 Id. at 5, 11.
181 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
182 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 9.
183 Other important corporate governance occurrences include the issuance in
November 1997 of a policy paper by the DTI titled "Proposed Guidelines for
Competition Policy," which outlined a broad legislative reform program that included,
among other issues, a review of existing securities regulations, and current practices and
regulations relating to corporate governance; and the release of another DTI document,
"Integrated Manufacturing Strategy" (IMS), which embodied the government's vision of
the kind of economy appropriate for South Africa. The IMS advised that "[e]nterprises
of all types and sizes will have to become adaptive, innovative[,] and internationally
competitive." GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 7-8.
184 The Report is named after former High Court judge Mervyn King.
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includes principles of good social, ethical, and environmental
practice.185 The second King Report of 2002/3 and the Code of
Corporate Practices and Conduct that complemented it (the report
simply elaborated or amplified the provisions embodied in the
code) built on the changes in corporate governance that the 1994
report introduced by acknowledging a shift away from the single
bottom line (or profit for shareholders) to a triple bottom line; this
means that companies should consider economic interests along
with social and environmental factors in their corporate decision
making, all the while keeping in mind that they are ultimately
accountable to the company or body of shareholders.' 86 King II
tracked the findings of an important study conducted in South
Africa from 2001-2002 that demonstrated that shareholders and
other investors attach importance to corporate governance and are
willing to pay a premium for the shares of a well-governed
company over a poorly managed company with a comparable
financial record.
87
The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct, which
accompanied the second King Report,'88 imposed a "requirement"
on companies to "comply or explain."'189 Under this "code"
regime, affected corporations, such as listed companies, banks,
financial and insurance institutions, and certain categories of
public sector enterprises, must comply with provisions in the Code
of Corporate Practices and Conduct. If they fail to comply, they
must justify their non-compliance in their annual reports' 90 Stated
differently, the King Code requires a company to report at least
once a year on its policies on social, ethical, safety, health,
environmental and related matters, but leaves it to the board of
each company to decide what it deems relevant for disclosure in
"regard to the company's particular circumstances."' 9' The issue
185 See Mongalo, supra note 2, at 114.
186 See id. at 114.
187 See id. at 102. See also id. at 102 n.54. Mongalo interprets this finding to mean
that "by simply developing good governance practices, directors are potentially able to
attract a greater number of long-term investors." Id. at 102.
188 See id.
189 Id. at 102.
190 Id.
191 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 102.
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of AIDS, on which Salomon did her study, is one example.
"[L]isted companies do not have to take any prescribed action;
rather, [they] are only required to document to what extent they
are responding to the AIDS epidemic in their workplace."' 192
Although unveiled in the wake of corporate failures in both South
Africa and abroad, it is interesting that the United States and South
Africa took different approaches to dealing with the problem: the
United States achieved compliance through the threat of legal
sanctions represented in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, while
South Africa applied a self-censoring technique. 193
Mongalo's piece, published the same year as the guidelines,
tracks the document verbatim in more than a few places.
Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that this black South
African, who later left his job in academia to join the DTI as
project manager of corporate law reforms, helped author the
document. We will take the impetuses one by one. Mongalo
appears to share the view of the DTI that the occurrence of
fundamental changes in the business environment in which
businesses operate is necessary in reforming corporate governance
principles. He commented that because "[w]e live in an era where
investment can be moved from one part of the world to another
with the click of a mouse," "the main objective" of a reformed
company law "should be the encouragement of foreign direct
investment., 194 Mongalo also wants "serious note" to be "taken of
the fact that corporate law is becoming increasingly globalized,
where all countries are fighting for investor capital."' 95
Along with the DTI, Mongalo embraces the impetus relating to
a new constitutional dispensation dictating a move away from
conventional corporate governance principles. Not only does he
defend the BEE Act and related affirmative action measures as
good corporate-governance practices that should form a central
192 Salomon, supra note 53, at 1486.
193 Id. One South African put the matter memorably when he stated, "while one
system promotes the employment of an army of lawyers to find the best possible ways
around a plethora of laws, the other involves employing an army of consultants to
address how the principles will be best applied to an organization." Id. See also Pinto,
supra note 97, at 501, n.77 (indicating that the U.S. approach "may be related to the need
for greater protections in a market based system.").
194 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 116.
195 Id.
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part of a reformed law of corporate governance in South Africa,'96
he also supports "a more explicit recognition of the role of
stakeholders within corporate law" beyond the "triple-bottom-
line" philosophy of the King Committee. 97 In justifying this
wholly integrated approach to corporate governance, Mongalo,
like the DTI, pointed to South Africa's post-apartheid constitution
whose provisions, including its supremacy clause, he said
mandated a more harmonious "balanc[ing]" of shareholder-
investor interests and those of the public or other stakeholders, and
counseled dispensation with the most exclusive principles of
conventional governance law.'98
With respect to the third and last impetus, Mongalo, like the
DTI, believes South African corporate governance law to be sorely
outdated and in dire need of modernization.' 99 As a result of the
increased globalization of the South African economy in a number
of areas, the current framework of corporate governance in the
country is "holding back, rather than facilitating competitiveness,
growth and investment., 20 0 The embedment of South Africa's law
of corporate governance in English law and the law's lag in
modernization have "led to unfortunate consequences, at a
substantial cost to businesses and the economy., 21' Also, like the
DTI, Mongalo advocates the imperativeness of good corporate
governance for the South African economy.2 2 Foreign direct
investment "from all quarters of the globe" is crucial to South
196 See id. at 112-15.
197 Id. at 115. For all the major advance it represents in the direction of an
integrated or all-inclusive approach to corporate governance, Mongalo did not think the
second King Report went far enough. He complained, "in view of the country's past,
King II should have recommended changes to the core of directors' duties to
accommodate the interests of other stakeholders," rather than "ignor[e] calls for a more
explicit recognition of the role of stakeholders within corporate law. Merely
communicating relevant issues to stakeholders without involving them in corporate
decision-making runs contrary to the very same triple-bottom-line advocated by King
II." Id. King II discussed stakeholder communication matters under § 4 of the Report
entitled "Integrated Sustainability Reporting." Stakeholder communications matters are
also set forth in T 5 of the Code.
198 See id. at 97. See also id. at 114, n. 131.
199 See id. at 115.
200 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 115.
201 Id. at 97.
202 See id. at 109.
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Africa's economic growth.2 °3 Given this occurrence, "a good
system of corporate governance must be in place. ' '204  He
approvingly cites Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, who stated that "no market
has a divine right to investor.' capital," but rather "[m]arkets exist
by the grace of investors." 2°5 He claims that directors who adopt
good governance practices can potentially increase the number of
long-term investors they attract, and comments on the profundity
of the "implications of good corporate governance for companies,"
citing the statement of James Wolfesohn, former President of the
World Bank, to the effect that "[t]he proper governance of
companies will become as crucial to the world economy as the
proper governing of countries. 2 6 Mongalo agrees that there are
many reasons why businesses fail that have little or nothing to do
with how they are managed, but insisted that most of the "classic
collapses" during the past decades can be attributed to the failure
of conventional corporate governance principles.2 7
Finally, in some respects, Mongalo's recommendations for
change parallel that of the proposals DTI made for promoting the
competitiveness and development of South Africa's economy
through company law, but in other respects, his recommendations
exceed those of DTI.2 °8 For example, Mongalo advised that "a
balance be struck between self-regulation and state
intervention.,"209 "A framework of company law" that is "too
interventionist," he said, "may have the opposite effect of chasing
,,210
away the investment necessary for economic development.
Mongalo recommended the codification or regulation by
legislation of directors' duties to correct the present situation
characterized by "so many sources of duties of directors, namely,
the common law, statute, and codes of good practice, which all
203 See id.
204 Id. at 109.
205 See id. at 97.
206 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 102.
207 Id. at 102, n.53.
208 Id. at 97.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 116.
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operate in tandem. 2 1'  The case for codification is supported by
the fact that "the exact details of the core duties of directors at
common law can be determined only through a process of
reconciling a number of conflicting cases, some of which date
back to the early [nineteenth] century., 212 However, principles
only suitable for certain businesses, like listed companies, should
be left as codes of good practice, given that these codes have the
advantage of flexibility in the sense that individual companies can
apply them in a way that best fits their own circumstances and,
compared to statutes, the codes are easier to update.
213
V. South Africa and the Scholarship on the Law of
Comparative Corporate Governance
A. Overview of the Scholarship on the Law of Comparative
Corporate Governance
Generally speaking, a comparative study involves a systematic
examination of similarities and differences between or among
nations or regions designed to explain those similarities and
differences.214 As Professor Brown stated, "[t]he comparative
method compels us to identify similarities and differences, and
then to account for them.215 We are led away from description,
and toward explanation.216 We see every aspect of our subject in a
new light., 217 In comparative law, "[a] deep understanding of'
different legal systems "could lead to lessons to be learned from
each system that could influence the development of law" and
possibly "lead to emulation and practical attempts to unify or
harmonize law., 218  Finally, comparative corporate governance
211 Id. at 109.
212 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 109.
213 Id. at 115-16.
214 BERNARD E. BROWN, COMPARATIVE POLITICS: NOTES AND READINGS 2
(Thomson Higher Education, 2006).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. See also THEEN & WILSON, supra note 48, at 3 (stating, "[a] broad,
worldwide examination of political experience permits generalizations and the
identification of tendencies and perhaps even continuities.").
218 Pinto, supra note 97, at 484. See also BACKER, supra note 88, at xxxviii (stating
that comparative corporate governance is concerned with "[t]he power of harmonization,
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scholarship seeks to understand and illuminate approaches
governments in various regions of the world take relating "to the
regulation of the corporation, '21 9 with specific "attention to the
origins and durability of the differences between countries or
regions., 22' The business organization the field centers its primary
focus on is the publicly held corporation.22'
1. Sources of Contribution to the Scholarship on the
Law of Comparative Corporate Governance
Early scholarship relating to the law of comparative corporate
governance was instead of being designed to achieve explanatory
ends, descriptive and formalistic.222 These early studies also
followed a micro approach with focus on particular countries and
differences in corporate law systems.223  They were also
teleological in the sense that they were scholarship designed to
shape or influence the development of corporate rules in other
countries. 224 Beginning from the early 1990s, a shift to a macro
approach beyond individual countries took place in comparative
corporate governance. 225  This shift in focus was influenced by
economic and corporate events within the United States, including
the recession and poor corporate performance of some U.S.
companies, which compelled commentators to look at the more
successful economies of Germany and Japan in an attempt to
determine whether these countries' corporate governance systems
contributed to their economic successes.226 The shift in focus to a
emulation, penetration, convergence, and separation," and that the field seeks to explain,
among other things, why and how, for example, "different systems reach similar results
when confronted by the same problem.").
219 BACKER, supra note 88, at xxxviii.
220 Id. at 3.
221 Pinto, supra note 97, at 478. As Professor Pinto points out, although the
situation appears to be changing for good, comparative corporate governance neglects
the closely held corporation. Id. at 478, n.5.
222 See id. at 482.
223 See id.
224 See id. One of these early country-specific studies that Professor Pinto cited is
ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 75-95 (Foundation Press, 1976).
225 Id,
226 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 482. One of these corporate occurrences was the
hostile takeover era in the 1980s, a period during which some attention was devoted to
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macro scholarship led not only to studies on different ownership
models (discussed below) but also to inquiries as to whether
corporate governance was a factor in economic competitiveness.227
If it was, then "the study of comparative corporate governance
mattered from a policy point of view. 228  One work which
exemplified this period was Strong Managers, Weak Owners,
written by Mark Roe and published in 1994.229
One group that has made important contributions to the
development of comparative corporate governance scholarship is
traditional comparative law scholars.23° These scholars specialize
on the issue of legal transplants, or specifically on how and if law
can be exported.231 What lends importance to this line of inquiry
is that it raised the issues of corporate governance in the context of
developing non-Western countries. The scholarship also sired
studies by Professor Paredes and others who, for example, in
writing about "why importing U.S. corporate law isn't the
answer," furthered the debate on the transplant issue.232 A second
the ownership of foreign corporations because concentrated ownership, explained below,
meant that a hostile takeover was virtually impossible. The failure of the corporate
raider, T. Boone Pickens, in an attempted takeover of a Japanese company raised the
issue of open markets and corporate governance. See id. at 483, n.19.
227 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 482-83.
228 Id. at 483.
229 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (Princeton Univ. Press, 1994). The study challenged
the traditional assumption that the emergence of America's widely or publicly held
corporations was an occurrence dictated entirely by economics. Roe found that, unlike
American corporations, where shareholders are scattered and rarely play a prominent
role, German and Japanese firms are often monitored by large shareholders, such as
banks and insurance companies. He said that political factors more than economics,
especially traditional American hostility to concentrated financial power, account for the
difference between the United States and these systems. See also MARK J. ROE,
POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT,
CORPORATE IMPACT (Oxford Univ. Press, 2003); See also Mark J. Roe, Political
Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539
passim (2000).
230 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 484. Pinto states that "an understanding of other
disciplines will help explain similarities and differences in systems." Id.
231 See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L REV. 1055 passim
(2004).
232 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 484, n.26. Paredes, supra note 231.
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group of contributors to the scholarship on comparative corporate
governance are financial economists who, through empirical
research, have helped remove the study of comparative corporate
governance from the formalism and non-empirical methodology of
traditional comparative law.233 "Unlike traditional comparative
law, financial economists have looked to see if a particular model
is better or optimal., 234 Their influence "has broadened the study
by showing corporate governance in the larger context of
financing business and economic performance. '235  However, in
another sense, their contribution also narrowed the field by
excluding "non-finance issues, such as the role of the corporation
in society and other non-financial stakeholders. '236 Additionally,
empirical research tells less than a complete story of the complex
issues involved in corporate governance since it tends to exclude
non-economic factors, such as cultural values, that in some
societies may impinge ineluctably on corporate governance.237
Professor Licht has called attention to such omissions in an
important work that he instructively titled "The Mother of all Path
Dependencies. ' 211
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, one source, no
less important than the two groups above, that has exerted
enormous influence on comparative corporate governance
scholarship is the United States. Professor Pinto detailed several
U.S. studies and schools of thoughts that "became integral parts of
the scholarship on comparative governance from both a theoretical
and empirical perspective., 23 9 Going from past to present, these
233 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 484-85.




238 See Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-
Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 passim
(2001).
239 Pinto, supra note 97, at 482. This is a better view of things than the view
espoused by Professor Skeel who, in writing about "the comparative turn in corporate
governance scholarship," implied comparative governance scholarship to be a mere
extension of, or appendage to, U.S. corporate governance law. David A. Skeel Jr.,
Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1549 (May 2004) (reviewing REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Oxford Univ. Press, 2004)). Skeel's point was that "if we had
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bodies of scholarship include Professors Berle and Means's
seminal study of publicly-traded corporations with the notion of
separation of ownership from control that the study contributed as
its central insight;2" the work on agency costs by Professors
Jensen and Meckling;241 the scholarship on "monitoring board" by
Professor Eisenberg;24 2 the law and economics movement with
their emphasis on market solutions over regulatory approaches as
a means to lower agency costs; 243 and the work of Kraakman and
others presenting an analytic framework designed to facilitate an
understanding of comparative corporate governance. 24
2. Issues and Concepts in the Scholarship on the Law of
Comparative Corporate Governance
Two important issues that have formed the object of attention
in the literature on the law of comparative corporate governance
possessed the" analytic framework developed and applied in this book that he reviewed,
"at the outset of the comparative turn in corporate governance scholarship," recent
debates about the similarities and divergences of different governance regimes "might
have had a much less helter-skelter quality." Id. at 1550.
240 ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (MacMillan 1932) (identifying the growing separation between
ownership and control in America's largest corporations). Another landmark study in
the line of classic corporate governance law books is THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY (Edward S. Mason, ed., Harvard Univ. Press, 1959).
241 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Finn: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 passim (1976).
242 See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS (Little, Brown, 1976). A monitoring board oversees the managers of a
company rather than attempt to run the business directly.
243 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (Harv. Univ. Press, 1991) (contending that the principal
task of corporate law is to limit the conflict of interest or "agency costs" between
managers and shareholders, and that American corporate law facilitates this goal by
providing a menu of default rules the parties can alter by contract if they so choose).
244 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 1 (attempting to identify the
underlying structure of corporate law and to provide a framework for understanding "the
common structure of the law of business corporations ...across different national
jurisdictions."). As Professor Skeel, who reviewed this book, stated, its authors
emphasized "the function, rather than the form, of the corporate governance approaches
used in different jurisdictions." Skeel, supra note 239, at 1539. He assessed that the
book "does not extend or refine the current literature so much as it provides a framework
for understanding it." Id. at 1549.
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are (1) the shareholder-stakeholder debate, and (2) the dispersed
and concentrated ownership debate.2 45  The first issue concerns
whether decision-making in corporations should focus exclusively
on shareholders or include entities other than shareholders that are
known as stakeholders (the shareholder-stakeholder debate).24
Commentators who argue that shareholders' interest should form
the focus in corporate decision-making view the publicly held
corporation "in purely economic terms as a means by which
capital is raised from a large number of public savers and used by
businesses. 247  To these commentators, since shareholders and
creditors are the owners of equity or suppliers of capital, corporate
governance should give primacy to these equity owners and the
directors who manage the business of the company for their
benefit.248  Commentators who advocate a more inclusive
approach in corporate decision-making that integrates stakeholders
respond that large companies or corporations in society impact
interests other than shareholders where their businesses operate;
therefore, they should at least be accountable to society for the
implications of corporate actions.249 Stated differently, these non-
shareholder interests, along with those of shareholders who supply
capital, ought to have a role in corporate governance.25 0  These
commentators usually point to labor, which invests human capital
245 Two observations or comments are in order here. The first is the interconnection
of these two critical issues embodied in the shareholder-stakeholder debate, and the
debate/position relating to ownership models. Concentrated ownership structures appear
to be connected with the stakeholder model. As Professor Pinto states, "[a]rguments for
a stakeholder model of corporate governance seem more prevalent in countries where
there is concentrated ownership." Pinto, supra note 97, at 478. A second observation is
that the ownership model issue tracks many issues, among them the question of conflicts
of interest or "agency costs" that result whenever one party acts on behalf of another, an
occurrence which presents the risk that the party will pursue his own interests rather than
those of the other party. These "conflicts" or "costs" fall into three general categories:
conflicts between the corporation's shareholders and its managers; between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders; and conflicts between the corporation and
contracting parties, such as creditors, employees, and customers. See Skeel, supra note
239, at 1528-29.
246 Id.
247 Pinto, supra note 97, at 479.
248 Id.
249 See id. See also id. at 479, n.6.
250 Id. at 479.
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into a business, as an example of a stakeholder interest that
deserves representation in corporate decision-making.25' Writing
about South Africa, Mongalo stated that the stakeholder approach
was necessary to "take account not only of the shareholders, but
also of the imbalances of the past" created by the segregation laws
of the apartheid era.252 He stated that the dismantling of apartheid
in the country revealed "[t]he shibboleths of the" shareholder
approach and led to "the realization that companies were not
operating in a vacuum.
253
As Professor Pinto cautions, these two positions are not cast
stagnantly in stone as they often appear.254 Instead, they are
dynamic. 255  He observed that the role of stakeholders can be
viewed from two possible perspectives: external or internal. 6 An
external perspective sees stakeholders as outside the internal
corporate governance and may suggest that their interests be
protected under the concept of corporate social responsibility.257
An internal perspective will attempt to include stakeholders more
directly in corporate governance. 8 Since a broad definition of
stakeholders can create difficulty in ensuring that the corporation
is meeting its obligation to all related interests, some
commentators who advocate a stakeholder approach to corporate
governance "view stakeholders more narrowly to only those who
contribute firm-specific assets," such as suppliers, customers, and
labor, a notion "which fits better into a contractual theory of the
firm., 259 Also, "a shareholder model does not necessarily suggest
stakeholders are irrelevant," but rather only that they are "not part
of the internal corporate governance., 261 What is more, "[e]ven
where shareholder protection is the focus of the agenda in some
251 See id.
252 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 114.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Pinto, supra note 97, at 478.
256 Id. at 482.
257 Id. at 479, n.6.
258 Id.
259 Id. at481, n.12.
260 Id. at 477, n. 1.
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countries the role of stakeholders is part of the focus." 2 6 '
A second important issue of immense attention in the
scholarship on the law of comparative corporate governance
revolves around how and why two particular ownership regimes
for publicly listed corporations developed in certain countries or
regions of the world and whether any of these ownership models
or regimes is "particularly beneficial for corporate governance
because it provides a competitive edge to corporations organized
pursuant" to that model or regime.262  The two ownership
structures or models in question are (1) widely dispersed
ownership where no shareholder or group of shareholders owns a
significant percentage of shares; and (2) concentrated ownership
where there are groups of shareholders, such as family, corporate
groups, or financial institutions that own significant percentages of
shares. 263 The first structure or model is exemplified by countries
like the United States and the United Kingdom.264 This model
"relies more on market [financing] and the importance of
liquidity., 265  It is worth noting, however, that over time
"institutional shareholders[,] such as mutual and pension funds[,]
have become major stockholders" in large corporations in these
two countries, even more so perhaps in the United Kingdom.266
The second regime or model is exemplified by much of the non-
Anglo-American world, including continental Europe and Japan.267
Unlike the dispersed pattern, which relies more on market
financing and liquidity, the concentrated model relies more on
private institutions for both financing and monitoring.268
261 Pinto, supra note 97, at 502, n.80.
262 Naomi Cahn, Corporate Governance Divergence and Sub-Saharan Africa:
Lessons from Out Here in the Fields, 33 STETSON L. REV. 893, 898 (Spring 2004). See
also William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance
and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSN'L L. 213, 216 (1999-2000) ("Corporate law's leading question is whether there is
a national corporate governance system (or component thereof) t'iat possesses relative
competitive advantage.").
263 Pinto, supra note 97, at 480.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 See id. at 480 n.9; Skeel, supra note 239, at 1529 n.25.
267 Cahn, supra note 262, at 898.
268 Pinto, supra note 97, at 480.
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Within comparative corporate governance scholarship,
enormous theoretical and empirical footwork has been invested
and "designed to explain the outcome of the dispersed and
concentrated ownership" models.269  These explanations or
"stories," as Professor Pinto denominated them, are (1) law
matters, (2) history and politics matters, (3) interest groups, and
(4) deep causation.270 The three latter explanations are responses
to law matters. 271 All three recognize a role for law but see other
explanations for why dispersed ownership emerges or fails to
emerge in a specific country or region.272 Note that each of the
four explanations has its weakness(es). 273 The basic thesis of the
"law matters" school, typified by the empirical-oriented
scholarship of financial economists like Professor La Porta and
others, is that the law determines ownership structure and systems
of corporate finance and governance.274 According to this school,
the more protective the law is in a country, the more likely it is
that a dispersed ownership and economic development will occur
within that country.275 Stated differently, "ownership will remain
concentrated" in a country unless the affected country "provides
legal protections for minority shareholders, such as a fiduciary
duty requirement or voting rules that magnify the voice of small
shareholders. 276  For this school, the existence of these
269 Id. at 491.
270 Id. at 492.
271 Id. at 494.
272 See id. at 494.
273 See Skeel, supra note 239, at 1545-48. However, Professor Skeel's analysis
covered only the first three explanations and did not include deep causation. Skeel
points out that these explanations, with the variety of new theses they embed, have had a
positive effect on comparative corporate governance: they have enabled scholars to "take
a closer look [at] the governance patterns of countries throughout the world. More than
ever before, the new corporate governance literature has brought economists, historians,
political scientists, and law professors into a single, very important conversation." Id. at
1548-49. The assessment is debatable given that, as I point out in V.B. below, the
"countries throughout the world" Skeel commented on do not include Africa.
274 See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.
FIN. 471 passim (1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. EcON. 1113
passim (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131 passim (1997).
275 Pinto, supra note 97, at 492.
276 Skeel, supra note 239, at 1544.
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protections in the United States and the United Kingdom, vis-a-vis
the absence of these protections elsewhere, explains why
shareholdings are dispersed in these two countries but
concentrated elsewhere.277  "Law matters" proponents see
concentrated ownership as a poor substitute for markets and hold
up legal protection as a solution for both developed and
developing economies.278 An ancillary point to the basic thesis
espoused by this school is that a common law system with the
case-by-case development it affords is "ideally suited to keeping
pace with changes in commercial life," given that "judges have the
flexibility to adapt existing precedent to new developments. 279
By contrast, these proponents argue, civil law systems are rigid in
that they rely on strict rules with little judicial discretion. 280 "On
this view, the emergence of dispersed ownership and market-based
governance in the United States and the United Kingdom may
reflect the superior adaptability of these nations' judicial
systems. 28 ' Despite its limitations, this school through its
scholarship "has transformed corporate law and corporate finance
scholarship," and is, as Professor Skeel assesses, "the
acknowledged inspiration for the rapidly expanding recent
literature on the determinants of different corporate governance
regimes. 282
The position of the "history and politics" explanation,
exemplified by Professor Roe and others, is that it is history and
politics, not law, that determines which ownership structure, either
dispersed or concentrated, prevails in a country.283 For Professor
Roe, who has studied both the United States and social
democracies in Europe, political factors are key as to why
different ownership models emerged in different nations.284 Roe
wrote that "corporate governance is strongly 'path dependent,"'
meaning that "certain political forces push a country down a
277 Id.; see also Pinto, supra note 97, at 492-93.
278 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 494. See also Skeel, supra note 239, at 1544.
279 Skeel, supra note 239, at 1545.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 1546.
283 See Roe, supra note 229.
284 Pinto, supra note 97, at 494.
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particular path." Once on a path, a country will experience
difficulty pulling itself out of the path, because "local interests and
institutions develop connections to and affinities for the path. 285
The "interest groups" explanation, exemplified by the financial
economists Zingales and Rajan, argue that it is the interaction
between interest groups and external shocks that determines the
liquidity or illiquidity of a nation's equity markets.286 Zingales
and Rajan question the results of Roe's scholarship based on the
United States and social democratic countries in Europe: "if
politics and history matter, why is there not a consistent vision in a
particular country?, 287  Without discounting the relevance of
political factors, this school argues, at least with respect to Europe,
that "it is not social democracy but rather the protectionism of
local interests that keeps markets closed from competition. 288 For
them, "the key to dispersed ownership, raising capital, and
improved corporate governance, is a market-based system and
open competitive trade. 289  Although, like all the other
explanations it also has its problems, Professor Skeel praises this
school as "in many respects the most versatile of the recent
explanations[.]" 290
The "deep causation" explanation, exemplified by the work of
Professor Licht and others, stresses the role of "deep" factors, such
as culture, in the determination of which ownership model
emerges or prevails within a country. Professor Licht's approach
is to identify cultural types and other "deep" factors and to
determine the correlations between these factors. 291  Although
Licht's research is empirical, this school also uses theoretical or
285 See id. at 494. See also id. at 494 n.60.
286 Skeel, supra note 239, at 1548. See also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales,
The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century,
69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 passim (2003). See also RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES,
SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL
MARKETS TO CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (Random House 2003)
(targeting a more popular readership audience).
287 Pinto, supra note 97, at 495.
288 Id.
289 See id.
290 Skeel, supra note 239, at 1548.
291 See Licht, supra note 238, at 147 passim.
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non-empirical research in analyzing deep factors.292
A matter paralleling the discussion relating to ownership
models is "the role of the State in corporate governance, either as a
direct investor or through its indirect influence on corporate
decisions. 293 Concerning this topic, Professor Pinto explains that
"[w]hile privatizations have lessened the ownership role of the
State in many developed countries," that is not the case in
developing countries where there is no sign that the role of the
State is declining or will decline. 294 He points out that "[e]ven
where there is no ownership, the State can try to influence
corporate decisions through regulation or influence.2 95
A concept of comparative corporate scholarship interrelated to
the two ownership models discussed above is convergence. 6 The
discourse on convergence arises in the context of which of the two
ownership models is "optimal" or "most efficient for the
development of corporate law," and, for example, which structure
is the model to which other countries are assimilating
themselves. 297  But convergence is elastic in terms of endless
possibilities and a concept different writers define differently. 298 It
could mean movement toward one rule or system or creation of a
hybrid model.299 It could be formal in the sense that legal rules are
converging or a harmonization limited only to corporate
governance functions.3°° There are other possibilities as well:
goals can converge without legal or functional convergence
emerging.3 ' Similarities among systems may be limited or
minimal even with formal convergence.3"2 Harmonization "may
also be limited to large multinational corporations in developed
292 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 496. See also id. at 496, n.66.
293 Id. at 477 n. 2.
294 Id. See also id. at 502, n.82.
295 Id. at 477 n.2.
296 Id. at 499.
297 Id. at 477-78. See also Cahn, supra note 262, at 895, 898.
298 Pinto, supra note 97, at 499 n.72.
299 Id. at 500.
300 Id.
301 Id. at 499, n.72.
302 Id.
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economies and... inapplicable to developing economies."3 3
"Harmonization" could also involve issues outside corporate
governance like unionization (which different developed countries
approach differently).30 4  A "harmonization" could also result
because multinationals do business under both systems and "must
conform to the strictures of each."3 °5 Also, "some deliberate cross-
over [could occur] as governments and corporations discover the
benefits of the differing systems. 3 °6 Or could it be something that
occurs when developing economies "catch up" with the developed
economies?3 °7 Or perhaps it is a movement of global economies
toward market-based systems.30 8 In some countries, wholesale
adoption of rules may be a reaction to crisis created by scandals,
an occurrence that may tum out to be unproductive, especially if
they were adopted without regard to local conditions. 30 9 Also "the
adoption of particular rules may suggest that these changes are
aspirational or cosmetic," or "a recognition of the evolution
toward a particular ownership model such as dispersed
ownership. '310 Furthermore, "changes in rules with increased
shareholder protection may not mean a change in ownership
structure."31' Also, "optimal corporate governance mechanisms
may be more contextual and vary by industries and activities. 312
The sources of the phenomenon could also vary: convergence
could be the product of harmonization resulting from growing
interdependence and interconnection spelled by globalization, or it
could be the result of political process with compromises designed
to reach a particular result, as is exemplified by occurrences within
303 Id.
304 Pinto, supra note 97, at 503, n.83.
305 Cahn, supra note 262, at 898.
306 See id.
307 See Pouncy, supra note 88, at 102.
308 See id. at 95 (stating "developing economies, by focusing on rapid technological
development, would, in time, converge with developed economies, providing
comparable levels of output per capita, income, and growth, thereby increasing general
societal welfare"). This statement, meant to support catchment, could also plausibly be
read to mean adoption of a market-based orientation by developing economies.
309 Pinto, supra note 97, at 502, n.78.
310 Id.
311 Id. at 502, n.81.
312 Id. at 502, n.79.
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the European Community.33 Harmonization could also go two
ways rather than just one.314
Given the possibilities outlined above, disagreement among
scholars on the term and the effects supposed to flow from
convergence are issues regarding which scholars disagree.3 5
Whereas some scholars identify a consensus around convergence,
others disagree, believing that "neither shareholder primacy nor
dispersed ownership has or will easily converge. 3 16  For these
critics, path dependence (meaning history and political forces in a
country) has set up structures that are not easily changed, and,
within a country, there may be forces with powerful interests in
preserving the existing system.3"7 In addition, as a result of a
particular path, "complementary institutions may make it more
difficult to foster change." '318  Consequently, "keeping [the]
existing system(s) may, in fact, be an efficient result."319  Such
"lack of convergence allows for diversity and suggests that
globalization will not easily change these models."32 In summary,
the law of comparative corporate governance regarding
convergence is characterized by such "persistence of diversity"
that "it is unclear what type of convergence may result," and even
"whether convergence is desirable or inevitable. 32'
A second concept is globalization.322 Globalization has had an
313 Id. at 499, n.72.
314 The example Professor Pinto gave was the shareholder primacy model often
described as an Anglo-American model. There could also, he said, be convergence away
from that model, particularly in the United Kingdom. Id. at 500, n. 73.
315 Pinto, supra note 97, at 500-02.
316 Id. at 501.
317 Id. at 499, n.60.
318 Id. at 501.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 500-503, 504; 503, n.83; 503, n.84; 504, n.86.
Professor Pinto stated that identifying what constitutes good corporate governance is a
complex endeavor that must be based on analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of a
system as well as underlying local conditions. Corporate governance is one piece of the
complex puzzle of what makes economies work. And given the complexity of law,
society, and related issues, it is hard to say whether a particular model of ownership or
focus of corporate governance is necessary, adaptable, optimal-much less superior. Id.
at 503-504. See also id. at 504, n.86.
322 Id. at 499.
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enormous influence on comparative corporate governance
scholarship.3 23  Professor Pinto's work emphasized the
interconnection between globalization and comparative corporate
governance.3 24  An important purpose of the Pinto piece was to
show the numerous ways, both economic and non-economic, in
which globalization has influenced and fostered both the
development of comparative corporate governance and its
scholarship.3 2' The economic dimensions of globalization, or
economic globalization, are decipherable through the impacts of
globalization on trade, capital markets, and multinational
corporations.326  Globalization, defined as interconnectedness
resulting from growing "extensity, intensity and velocity" of
global interactions that go beyond economics, has also influenced
and fostered the study and development of comparative
corporative governance.3 27 Pinto breaks down these broader non-
economic influences into categories, based on their sources of
origination, including: (1) globalization of people, (2)
globalization of information, (3) globalization of culture, and (4)
globalization of politics. 328 A side issue of comparative corporate
governance flowing from globalization is the impact of
globalization on the option for an ownership system or the
relationship between globalization and adoption of an ownership
321system.  In Professor Pinto's language summarizing the nature
of this relationship, "if globalization moves toward any particular
model, then convergence studies are also part of the globalization
debate. 3 0
323 Id.
324 Id. at 496-97 ("If globalization is about interconnectedness, then comparisons
and influences are bound to result. If globalization is also about competition, then not
only firms and people compete; related systems and ideas do as well."). Pinto stated that
the study of comparative corporative governance explains why models developed, and
suggests a more optimal system in a globalized world, as well as a move toward some
kind of convergence. Id.
325 Pinto, supra note 97, at 496.
326 See id. at 486-87.
327 Id. at 487.
328 See id. at 487-91.
329 Id. at 500.
330 Id.
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B. Changing Attention to Sub-Saharan Africa in the
Scholarship on the Law of Comparative Corporate
Governance
Scholarship in corporate governance assigns trifling attention
to Africa. 31 Three recent episodes illustrate this popular omission.
The first is the "comparative" study by Professor Kraakman of
Harvard Law School and six other world-renowned corporate law
scholars. 3 2  The work developed an analytic framework that,
although explicitly focused only on five developed countries, 33
claimed to "transcend... particular jurisdictions," thus maintaining
universal application.334 However the supposedly comparative
scholarship which also aimed to formulate an analytic framework
that could be applied to all countries, developed and developing,
did not cover corporate governance in developing countries.335
Notified of this omission by Professor Skeel in a version of his
review of the book before the published review, the authors
included a chapter 9 in the book titled "Beyond the Anatomy"
designed to correct the omission.336 The epilogue suggested
eleven "avenues" for further research, one of which is "to examine
to what extent and with which amendments our analytic
framework can be used to deal with emerging jurisdictions
issues., 337 Thus the book by Kraakman and his colleagues did not
include developing countries, such as those in Africa, even though
it is supposed to be comparative and even though it formulated an
analytic framework for all countries, both developed and
developing. 338 The correction, to the extent that it happened, was
due to Skeel's urging.339 The second episode is reflected in the
331 Cahn, supra note 262, at 895.
332 See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 239.
333 The five developed countries and economies are France, Germany, Japan, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Id. at v.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 215.
337 Id. at 226. See Skeel, supra note 239, at 1538-39 n.54 (disclosing "[t]his
eleventh avenue of further research was added in response to an earlier version of this
Review.").
338 Skeel, supra note 239, at 1538.
339 Id. at 1539, n.54.
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action of Professor Skeel himself: Skeel stated repeatedly in his
review of the Kraakman work that the book and the analytic
framework that it contains do not consider the distinctive
challenges of corporate governance in developing countries.34 °
Unfortunately, he fell into the same mistake of exclusion that he
sought to correct. Skeel, in his review of the book, presented three
adjustments that are necessary in a future edition to make the work
complete.3 41  Two of these, each of which Skeel would assign a
full chapter in a new edition of the book, are bankruptcy and
corporate groups and corporate boundaries.342  In contrast,
corporate governance in developing and transition countries would
receive only "an expanded epilogue. 343 What is the justification-
and where is the equal treatment?-in assigning a whole chapter
each to the topics of bankruptcy and corporate groups while
relegating the whole universe of developing and transition
economies to an "expanded" epilogue? As if this was not enough,
Skeel's analysis on "developing and transition countries" ended up
being a discussion limited only to former socialist countries with
no treatment of developing, non-transiting countries, such as those
in Africa.34  Skeel correctly observed, "[i]n terms of practical
importance, there is no greater corporate governance issue in the
world today than the question of how to improve the effectiveness
340 See id. at 1570 (stating that it is not "safe to assume that the typology will help
us to understand how corporate law functions in every country, everywhere in the world.
... If we have learned anything from the corporate governance reform projects of recent
years, it is that the strategies that are used in developed countries cannot simply be
transplanted into a developing country with the expectation that they will function in a
comparable way."); id. at 1573 ("By itself, [the new book] would be a most misleading
guidebook for understanding corporate governance in a developing or transition country.
Because the authors' typology is based largely on the law on the books, it is not designed
to make sense of the vicissitudes of corporate law in many countries .... "). See also id.
at 1523 ("[i]n the developing and transition nations whose corporate law has been a
particular concern in recent years... it is important to move beyond the typology in order
to account for problems such as limited judicial enforcement.").
341 Id. at 1523, 1550.
342 See Skeel, supra note 239, at 1550-1562 (bankruptcy); id. at 1562-1569
(corporate groups and corporate boundaries).
343 Id. at 1569.
344 The countries Skeel treated include Russia, Hungary, India, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Lithuania, and Romania. The only developing, non-transition country covered
is India. See id. at 1571-76. There were no African countries on the list, even though
Africa should be part of the developing world.
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of corporate governance in developing countries." '345 But to him,
developing countries mean only transition economies and certainly
exclude nations in Africa.346 The third and final episode pointing
to inattention in the literature against Africa is signified by
Professor Backer's casebook on comparative corporate law.347
The only mention of Africa in the textbook was in a footnote in
the preface where the author indicated that "[o]ther systems of
corporate governance are also worthy of study. The governance
systems of Latin America, the Indian subcontinent and Africa
merit discussion in their own right. 348
The limited attention to Africa means that the field and law of
comparative corporate governance fail to "adequately capture the
dilemma of developing countries," particularly those in sub-
Saharan Africa.349 It also signifies that the scholarship overlooks
the corporate governance problems in these developing
economies. 350 However, as Professor Cahn reminded us, issues of
corporate social responsibility, including corruption, "are
particularly important in developing countries that typically lack
the same labor, environmental, and other legal constraints" that we
take for granted in developed countries, one reason corporate
social responsibility should form a critical component in the laws
and operations of companies in developing countries like those
found in Black Africa.35' She advised there was no way we can
345 Id. at 1570.
346 See Skeel, supra note 239, at 1571-1576.
347 Backer, supra note 88.
348 See Backer, supra note 88, at xxxviii, n.2.
349 Cahn, supra note 262, at 895.
350 Id. at 899.
351 Id. at 896. Professor Cahn does not define "corporate social responsibility." A
good definition of the term in the context of mineral-producing countries in Africa is by
Ian Gary of the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), the official international humanitarian
agency of the U.S. Catholic Community. In a piece in which he advised that U.S. trade
with Africa should stress the values of human rights, Gary opined that U.S. oil
companies have a responsibility to help ensure that aggressive oil and other mineral
exploitation in mineral-rich African countries does not come at the expense of human
rights, the environment, and the human dignity of the poor. See Ian Gary, Oil for U.S.,
Hope for Them: U.S. Trade with Africa Should Stress Value of Human Rights, available
at http://www.crs.org/get-involved/advocacy/policy-and-strategic-issues/philly.cfm
(last visited March 7, 2007). The piece appeared originally as an op-ed in the
Philadelphia Inquirer on July 9, 2001.
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appreciate the particular problems countries that lack appropriate
governmental and corporate structures face and must overcome
unless we include those countries in the comparative corporate
governance literature.352
There are some signs of growing attention to Africa in the
scholarship on the law of comparative corporate governance.353
Professor Cahn's work itself ranks among the indicators of that
change.354 So also are the contributions of Professors Cohn and
Pouncy which, with Cahn's, form the basis for the survey in this
portion of the paper.355 This paper on South Africa is also
arguably another reflection of the changing attention. Similar is
the scholarship from Africa cited in the introduction of this
paper.35 6 Focusing on the Congo, formerly Zaire, and a privately-
financed initiative in Chad and Cameroon the World Bank is
associated with, Professor Cahn's work draws attention to the
dilemmas of corruption and ineffective government bureaucracies
corporations face in countries without the same standards of
governance and norms that are presumed as basic conditions for
meaningful business climate in developed economies.357 To
various extents, each of the works surveyed is a contribution to the
scholarship on the law of comparative corporate governance.
Professor Cohn's narration of his teaching experience based on
Uganda belongs in the micro approach in comparative governance
approach discussed above.35 8 In contrast, the separate works by
Professors Cahn and Pouncy are more comparative.359 All three
studies are non-empirical.36 °
352 See Cahn, supra note 262, at 896.
353 See, e.g,. Cahn, supra note 262; see also Pouncy, supra note 88; see also Stuart
R. Cohn, Teaching in a Developing Country: Mistakes Made and Lessons Learned in
Uganda, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (Mar. 1998).
354 Cahn, supra note 262.
355 Cohn, supra note 353, at 101 passim; Pouncy, supra note 88, at 85 passim.
356 See supra nn. 27-36.
357 See Cahn, supra note 262, at 893 passim.
358 See Cohn, supra note 353.
359 See Cahn, supra note 262. See also Pouncy, supra note 88.
360 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 485. Non-empirical research can provide an
important perspective which is lacking in empirical research. Professor Pinto notes that
"empirical research does not tell a complete story of a complex issue because it is
difficult to consider non-economic factors, such as culture or societal norms, that may be
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Invited in July 1997 to Kampala, Uganda, to teach a course in
securities regulations sponsored by the World Bank,16' Cohn said
that his "initial reaction was disbelief. What I knew about Uganda
was primarily the havoc wrought by years of ruthless dictators
and, more recently, rampant disease. A stock exchange
developing amidst such conditions seemed a far-fetched dream. 362
Yet to Cohn's puzzlement, "a stock exchange indeed was being
formed and a viable economy seemed to be in the making. 363
Uganda, once the "Pearl of Africa," having passed through the
destructive leadership of Idi Amin and Milton Obote, has now
come under the comparably more able new management of
Yoweri Museveni, beloved by western donors for his fight against
AIDS within his own country and for his amenableness to market
friendly policies.3" Yet Cohn beheld a corporate culture or arena
that was anything but developed:
Nothing existed except the laws, a Capital Markets Authority
that had no capital markets to regulate, and a stock exchange
devoid of stock. Broker-dealers existed in name only, with
nothing to trade and no experience in creating public issues.
There were no private companies that had engaged in a public
offering, and privatization offerings to the public were still in
the planning stages. There were few, if any, trained and
knowledgeable lawyers and accountants prepared for the
demands of a securities market. Indeed, few lawyers had seen
the Capital Markets Statute... or any of the Capital Markets
Authority's regulations.365
Based on assumptions drawn from his experience in the United
States, "where securities laws came well after the development of
primary and secondary securities markets," Cohn contemplated
that "the statutes, regulations, and organizational structure" in
significant for certain governance issues." Id.
361 Cohn taught "Development and Regulation of Capital Markets" to a group of
government officials, private-sector attorneys, bankers, and broker representatives.
Cohn and a co-teacher, Promodh Malhotra, appointed by the International Law Institute,
taught the course five hours a day, five days a week for three weeks for a total of 75
hours. Cohn, supra note 353, at 101, 104.
362 Id. at 101.
363 Id.
364 Id. at 102.
365 Id. at 104.
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Uganda would "reflect[] market realities and development. 366
These assumptions turned out to be "self-delusion
extraordinaire"; 367 rather, in the country, "sophisticated rules and
institutions" had been "promulgated in an experiential vacuum.,
368
In the process of teaching the course, Cohn said he:
[S]oon learned that, despite the participants' senior public and
private positions, most of them had little knowledge of financial
and capital market subjects .... Rudimentary questions persisted
throughout the entire course... Only one person in the group had
ever owned an equity interest in a business. The rest had never
seen a stock certificate, had never made a securities investment,
and had never dealt with a broker-dealer.369
Various lessons Professor Cohn learned from his experience in
Uganda that he shared in this article boiled down to the fact that
local context matters: (1) thoroughly study the country and culture,
(2) get early classroom feedback on local concerns and conditions,
(3) use local materials as much as possible, (4) avoid the
temptation to preach U.S. laws and policies, (5) make use of local
events and issues, and (6) don't assume knowledge of local laws
(including access to those laws).37° In summation, "[t]he starting
point for any course or seminar should be the local conditions,
regulations, and goals. They preexist our courses and remain after
we have gone.'"371
To implement their program of "structural adjustment" on
clients' economies in return for "developmental" lending,
multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)372 have introduced a number
366 Id.
367 Cohn, supra note 353, at 104.
368 Id.
369 Id. at 105.
370 See id. at 107-8.
371 Id. at 108-9. Cohn says that the "use of United States law as models to emulate
in both developed and less developed countries" is an occurrence that is matched only by
the "growing use of English as the lingua franca." Id. at 101. Because lawmakers in
many countries in the world and on many subject areas see U.S. laws and policies as
models, imparting "knowledge of U.S. laws" can be "a valuable asset," but it can be an
asset that "is misused if not tailored to local conditions." Id. at 108.
372 The term "structural adjustment" should properly be adjudged a bureaucratic
newspeak in the sense that something, such as here treatment of a supposedly sick
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of "legal interventions" into the economies of those client
countries.373 One of these interventions in sub-Saharan Africa that
Professor Pouncy focused upon is stock markets, similar to the
kind Professor Cohn "experienced" in Uganda.374  Pouncy
criticized these markets as "a continuation of the neo-colonial
project, [and] the replication of Western institutions in the neo-
colony for the benefit of the Western economic hegemony, at the
expense of domestic interests. 375 With all the other mechanisms
of structural adjustment, including privatization, these markets
"create[] an institutional structure in [sub-Saharan Africa] that
facilitates the neo-colonial recapture" of African resources and re-
channel of those resources from "general domestic to specialized
foreign uses. ' ' 376 He stated that for economic development to
occur in any system, particularly economies built on export of
primary products, "there must be coordination between trade,
finance, and production, the three primary circuits of capital that
exist in market economies. 3 7  However, in Africa, "[t]he focus of
the legal interventions promoted by structural adjustment, such as
stock markets, is on the financial and trade circuits of capital," and
the ability of these interventions to impact the production circuit
"is limited by the focus of [sub-Saharan African] stock markets on
privatizations, rather than on the provision of capital for the
development of new firms or the expansion of existing ones. 378
Whereas "[t]he creation of stock exchanges in the West and in
Asia were closely related to the real economic functions of stock
markets[,] '3 79 in sub-Saharan Africa this legal intervention and
supporting institutions are used as tools by Western multinational
companies and African elites to "establish (or in some instances
economy, cannot be structural and at the same time merely an adjustment. Because the
term does not reflect the reality of severe pain that it imposes on an economy under
"adjustment," including currency devaluation and cutbacks in education, health, and
other social programs, the word is also properly a misnomer.
373 See, e.g., Karen Pfeifer, How Tunisia, Morroco, Jordan and even Egypt Became
IMF "Success Stories" in the 1990s, 210 MIDDLE EAST REP. 23, 23 (Spring 1999).
374 Pouncy, supra note 88 at 86. See also Cohn, supra note 353, at 108.
375 Pouncy, supra note 88 at 86.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 106.
378 Id.
379 Id. at 107.
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re-establish) claims to [sub-Saharan] resources, without serious
regard to their role as investment modalities. '"38 In other words,
for "Black Africa," "liberalized trade and investment regimes,
which are created using Western legal institutions, result in the
bleeding off of local capital that is used to acquire imported goods
or its investment through the auspices of the newly created stock
markets in the securities of foreign firms."'3 8' The World Bank,
IMF and donor countries promoted Western-style capital markets
in sub-Saharan Africa because they think these legal interventions
could help contain the corruption that permeates their economies
and "eliminate some of the opportunities for crony capitalism and
[help generate] broad distribution of corporate equities among
investors."'3 82 However, unfortunately, this expectation has not
materialized; instead, with few exceptions, stock markets in Black
Africa "have largely been used to float issues of privatized
firms. 3 83  Rather than serve any economic good, he said, these
stock markets will serve only to promote "uncertainty '3 84 and
much worse.3
85
Pouncy discussed two concepts of comparative corporate
governance law, globalization and convergence, both of which
portend negative effects or connotations for Africa.3 86  Professor
380 Id. at 106.
381 Pouncy, supra note 88 at 107.
382 Id. at 103.
383 Id. at 104. Pouncy intriguingly draws attention to the ideological roots of some
of these ostensibly neutral market devises. For example, privatization, a central element
in these market mechanisms, was part of the arsenal of contrivances Western capitalist
countries used to accomplish their "goal of confronting and isolating non-market-based
economic policies as part of its Cold War efforts." Id. at 103. Not only that, but in a
country like Britain, as former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, acknowledged in her
memoir since leaving office, "the economic rationales for privatization were secondary
to her ideologically based desire to injure British trade unionism." See id. 103, n. 78
(citing MARGARET THATCHER, THE DOWNING STREET YEARS 668-69 (1993)).
384 Id. at 115.
385 Id. ("[t]he only saving grace of economic under-development, the insulation of
[Sub-Saharan African] markets from off-border economic shocks, will be eroded as
investment in [the region's] assets become part of multinational holdings and subject to
investment decisions made without regard to their social impact, and regional and
international investment harmonization inserts [the region's] markets in a global
financial domino set, subject to financial contagions from which they may lack the
ability to recover.")
386 Pouncy has alternative names for each of these terms. "Economic convergence"
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Pouncy stated that globalization uses economic coercion "to
establish an economic hegemony capable of expropriating the
wealth of developing economies to the coffers of multinational
corporations without regard for human conditions, the
environment or the future. 3 87  What is more, "[u]nlike the
developing economies with strong manufacturing and industrial
sectors that are able to provide some competition to Western based
multinationals," globalization limits Black African economies to
the two primary roles of suppliers of raw materials and
commodities to international markets, and consumers of
"technologies and services produced by more developed
,,188economies. This assessment tracks and exceeds the
"prophetic" statement of Professor Pinto about criticisms of the
"evils" of globalization.389 Pouncy's notion of convergence is that,
staying on a capitalist path and "replicat[ing] the financial,
commercial, and legal institutions of the West," African
economies will eventually catch up with the developed
economies.3 90 However, the "promise" of economic convergence
"is illusory at best," possibly even "fraudulent," because stock
exchanges, privatization, and related legal interventions flowing
from structural adjustment measures, tailored as they are primarily
to "the reallocation of domestic resources from local to
international interests," are simply incapable of bringing about
such results.3 91 Pouncy further argued that the implementation of
structural adjustment programs in Sub-Saharan Africa did not
result in significant economic growth; assuming that economic
growth could be maintained in the region, which is not now the
case, "it would require between 89 and 264 years" for these
economies to approach the per capita incomes of developed
countries.392
for convergence, and multinational diversification" for globalization. See id. at 102, 108.
387 Id. at 109.
388 Pouncy, supra note 88 at 109
389 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 477, 497.
390 Pouncy, supra note 88, at 93.
391 Id. at 86, 101-02.
392 Id. at 101-02.
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VI. Application of the Scholarship on the Law of Comparative
Corporate Governance to South Africa
Applying the scholarship on the law of comparative corporate
governance to South Africa illustrates three findings that form the
arguments of this Article: (1) the South African discourse on
corporate governance reform reflects broad issues encountered
globally (2) at the same time South Africa presents a unique
circumstance which (3) raises the logical and legitimate question
whether, given its exceptionality, South Africa makes any notable
contribution to the scholarship on the law of comparative
corporate governance. Each is analyzed in turn.
A. Resonation of the Law of Comparative Corporate
Governance in the South African Discourse on the Reform
of Corporate Governance Law
Five key interconnected issues and concepts in the law of
comparative corporate governance referenced in the review of the
literature are (1) the shareholder-stakeholder corporate decision
making debate,393 (2) the debate centered on ownership models,394
(3) the role of the State in corporate governance in dispersed and
concentrated systems alike, that the two debates mirror,395 (4) the
meaning, likelihood and or imperativeness of convergence,396 and
(5) the influence of globalization on corporate governance.397
These issues and concepts find resonation in the South African
discourse on the reform of corporate governance law in that
country.
Based on government materials and the writings of scholars
such as Mongalo, there is a wellspring of consensus in favor of the
stakeholder approach. 398 As the DTI rationalized, "companies as
economic agents have an impact on society. ' ,399  This is an
393 Supra nn. 245-61 and accompanying texts.
394 Supra nn. 262-92.
395 Supra nn. 293-95 and accompanying texts.
396 Supra note 296-321 and accompanying texts.
397 Supra note 322-30 and accompanying texts.
398 See, e.g., GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3 at 13-18;
Mongalo, supra note 2, at 115.
399 GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 26.
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agreement reflected in the King Committee's notion of a shift
from a "single bottom line" of economic concerns centered around
shareholders to a "triple bottom line" that, in addition to economic
matters, also integrates social and environmental considerations in
corporate decision making.4°° However, judging from Mongalo's
criticism that the King Committee "ignor[ed] calls for a more
explicit recognition of the role of stakeholders within corporate
law, 40 1  there is no agreement on the mechanics of the
"stakeholder" approach, despite its widespread consensus.40 2 In
working out those mechanics, South Africa must keep in mind the
thoughtful counsel of Professor Pinto regarding the possible
counter-productivity that can follow defining relevant stakeholders
too broadly.4 3 Upon further consideration, this was probably the
reason why the King Committee embraced a stakeholder
perspective to corporate governance but indicated that directors
are ultimately responsible to the corporation.4
South Africa's option for the stakeholder perspective would
also suggest the concentrated regime as the prevailing ownership
model.405 However, it is not exactly clear that the ownership
regime in South Africa is the concentrated system, as The King
Committee assessed the dispersed model to be the prevailing
model and tailored its "agency costs" remedies around the
model.40 6 Mongalo speculates that what South Africa has is a
mixed system of both dispersed and concentrated ownerships. 40 7
The role of the State is saved for the next section on the sui
generis-ness of South Africa.40 8 The rest of the commentary here
400 Id. at 25.
401 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 115.
402 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
403 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 481, n. 12 ("A broad definition of stakeholder creates
difficulty in ensuring that the corporation is meeting its obligation to all related
interests.").
404 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
405 As Pinto argues, these two notions often operate together. See Pinto, supra note
97, at 478 ("Arguments for a stakeholder model of corporate governance seem more
prevalent in countries where there is concentrated ownership.").
406 See Mongalo, supra note 2, at 11 I (discussing the recommendations of the King
Report and Code).
407 See id. ("Clearly, there are two systems operating side by side.").
408 Infra Part VI. Section B.
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will focus on globalization and the related concept of
convergence. 40 9
Globalization is one of three impetuses the DTI policy paper
cited in reforming corporate governance in South Africa. 10
Although the paper simply denominated this impetus "a changing
environment, ' '41 1  the characteristics it describes: "greater
globalization, increased electronic communication, greater
sensitivity to social and ethical concerns, fast changing markets,
greater competition for capital, goods and services... [and]
mobility of international capital, 412  unquestionably suggest
globalization. The same could be said about Mongalo's
observation that "the economy has become more globalized [and]
the pace at which information technology is bringing change
within our corporate environment. ,,413 Each of these
expressions, as we see, went as far as deploying the magic word
"globalization. 414  Also present were some other operative
globalization features that Professor Pinto classified under
"globalization of information."4 ' Both the DTI policy paper and
the Companies Bill of 2007 were published-and are accessible-
online.416 Critics perceive globalization as a negative force in
developing societies.417 For South Africans, the main concern is
that "South Africa cannot afford to be left behind" while
globalization marches forward.418 In other words, the South
409 See supra note 330 and accompanying text for explanation of the nature of that
relationship.
410 The other two are a local context, signified by the adoption of a new Constitution
whose provisions dictate more harmonious balancing of the interests of investors and
other stakeholders and dispensation with exclusive rules of conventional corporate
governance law and the imperative need for modernization. These various forces are
analyzed in supra Part IV; see also GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra
note 3 at 13-18.
411 Id. at 13.
412 Id. (emphasis added)
413 Mongalo, supra note 2, at 115 (emphasis added).
414 See nn. 412-13 and accompanying texts.
415 See Pinto, supra note 97, at 489.
416 For the intemet addresses to these two sources, see supra nn. 3, 9.
417 See JOSEPH E. STIGLrZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS XIV (W.W.
NORTON & Co., 2003); see also Pouncy, supra note 88, at 109.
418 See GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3, at 13
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Africans view globalization as a matter of modernization without
which they stand the risk of being "left behind" as opposed to a
negative force.419 The key to understanding their attitude toward
globalization is "the need for modernization," which along with
globalization and "a new constitutional dispensation," formed the
impetuses for reform the DTI identified in its policy document.42°
If, as it seems, South Africa is not ill at ease with
globalization, there are good reasons for this occurrence. First,
globalization is not something new for South Africa.42'
"International perceptions are crucial to [South Africans'] hopes of
success." 422 Like many countries in the world, the government in
Pretoria borrows the ideas for its political and economic system,
including its corporate development, from Western countries,
particularly Britain. 423 Now in the post-apartheid era, and as a new
century unfolds, South Africa has increased its search for new role
models and is drawing from a wider range of countries beyond
Britain, including the United States and others.424  This
multinational borrowing accords with the South African
government's preference for multiple centers of power in the
international system, including Asian countries like China, in
place of either the bipolar structure that characterized the Cold
War or the current "unipolar moment" in the post-Cold War era
built around the "sole" superpower of the United States.425
Second, in contrast to many other developing societies, South
Africa has shock absorbers able to withstand the ravaging effects
of globalization.426 Pouncy, in reference to the establishment of
419 See id.
420 Id. at 13-18.
421 Russell, Pretoria Must Take the Crime Crisis Seriously, supra note 70, at 13.
422 Id.
423 See GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3 at 12 ("The current
framework in company law in South Africa is therefore essentially built on foundations.
put in place by the British in the middle of the I 9 th century.")
424 See id. at 12-13.
425 See Alec Russell, The Prickly Bricklayer, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 5, 2007, at
30. See also Alec Russell, East Steps Up Its Engagement with Pretoria, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 5, 2007, (Special Report on South Africa), at 3; William Wallis, China
Changes Dynamics of African Loans, FIN. TIMES (London), May 19-20, 2007, at 7.
426 See Michael Nowak, The First Ten Years After Apartheid: An Overview of the
South African Economy, in POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA I, 4 (Michael Nowak &
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stock markets instigated by World Bank and IMF structural
adjustment measures, complained that
[Tjhe only saving grace of economic under-development, the
insulation of [Sub-Saharan African] markets from off-border
economic shocks, will be eroded as investment in [the region's]
assets become[s] part of multinational holdings and subject to
investment decisions made without regard to their social impact,
and regional and international investment harmonization inserts
[the region's] markets in a global financial domino set, subject
to financial contagions from which they may lack the ability to
recover.
427
Obviously, South Africa harbors no fear of what Pouncy calls
deadly "financial contagions. 428  Pouncy also observed that
"[u]nlike the developing economies with strong manufacturing
and industrial sectors that are able to provide some competition to
Western based multinationals," globalization limits Black African
economies to the two primary roles: (1) purveyors of raw materials
to international markets, and (2) consumers of technologies and
services produced by more developed economies. 429  This also
does not apply to South Africa.4 0 The country does not seem like
a nation content to limit its role in the world economy to raw
material supplier and dumping ground for goods and services from
other countries.431 Instead, South Africa is competing globally and
investing abroad in a number of countries that include China.432
As a matter of fact, Pouncy's statement appears to exclude South
Africa since the country may qualify as a developing economy
Luca A. Ricci eds., 2005).
427 Pouncy, supra note 88, at 115.
428 Id.
429 Id. at 109.
430 According to World Bank figures, South African workers are more productive
and work in more capital-intensive industries than Brazil, Kenya, and all but the most
productive areas of mainland China. See World Bank, South Africa: An Assessment of
the Investment Climate at 7, World Bank Rep. No. 34907 (May 1, 2006).
431 Unlike similar economies, much of the investment in South Africa has been in
portfolio flows, as opposed to foreign direct investment. See International Monetary
Fund (IMF), The Composition of Capital Flows: Is South Africa Different?, at 3, IMF
WP 05/40 (Mar. 2005)
432 See, e.g., Alec Russell, Business Groups Eye China Potential, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 7, 2007, at 8.
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"with strong manufacturing and industrial sectors that are able to
provide some competition to Western based multinationals. 433
It is still undetermined which ownership system, dispersed or
concentrated, South Africa will end up converging to; or whether
it will even converge to one model or maintain a hybrid system.434
The question remains whether South Africa will limit its
convergence, assuming it functionally converges at all. Its history
and peculiarities will impact enormously in which direction South
Africa converges to in its ownership model (assuming it opts to
converge).435  As indicated before, local forces, evident in the
adoption of a new constitutional system mandating more
harmonious balancing of the interests of investors and other
shareholders and dispensation with exclusive rules of conventional
governance law, count among the three impetuses driving the
impending reform of the law of corporate governance in South
Africa.436 Assuming they choose to converge, whether fully or
partially, it is doubtful that South African companies, or
corporations in any other African countries for that matter, will
adopt a definition of convergence that includes catching up with
developed countries of the type that Professor Pouncy commented
on.
437
B. Factors that Render South Africa Sui Generis
Although the law of comparative corporate governance
resonates well in the South African discourse regarding corporate
governance law reform, South Africa is sui generis or the only
example of its kind in Africa. Some of the studies in the
scholarship on the law of comparative corporate governance
focusing on Africa, to the extent that they have a comparative
depth, excepts South Africa by name.438 For example, Pouncy
433 Pouncy, supra note 88 at 109.
434 See supra Part V, Section A, Subsection 2.
435 Other exogenous factors, such as the role of non-governmental organizations and
other private networks, will also have an effect on the convergence issues. See Lee A.
Tavis, Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable Peace:
Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J TRANSAT'L L. 487, 509-
510 (2002).
436 See GUIDELINES FOR CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3 at 13-18.
437 See supra nn. 390-92 and accompanying texts.
438 See, e.g. James C. Owens, Note, Government Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa:
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singles out South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia as the stock
exchanges in sub-Saharan Africa, not resulting from
privatizations, and whose initial public offerings, compared to all
the others, "have been largely devoted to raising additional capital
for listed mid-range firiS."
4 39
Critics opposed to classification of the rainbow nation as sui
generis will point to the country's "two-tiered economy," one
developed and the other "marginalized," complete with
characteristics of the kind associated with the least developed
societies in Africa.440 They will comment that South Africa posts
high unemployment figures," high crime rates," 2 and that it has
more people infected with HIV/AIDS than any other country in
the world, 43 among other underdevelopment stories." 4  While
there is merit to these arguments, they are at best only partial
truths that are unavailing. Some of the underdevelopment features
critics point to are remnants from the apartheid past, not amenable
to easy fixes, that the ANC government is working to resolve.445
Also, in contrast to its marginalized sector, South Africa boasts
developed components in its economy that many other African
countries, steeped deeply in underdevelopment, lack." 6  The
analogy here will be to call the United States a less developed
The International Community's Options, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1013 (2003) (noting
that South Africa is the most developed sub-Saharan nation).
439 Pouncy, supra note 88, at 104.
440 See supra note 62.




442 Supra note 70.
443 See supra note 69.
444 Recently, The Economist ranked South Africa 92nd out of 111 on their quality of
life scale. This placed South Africa below Bangladesh, Vietnam and Iran. See The
Economist Intelligence Unit's Quality of Life Index, ECONOMIST (2005), available at
http://www.economist.commedia/pdf/QUALITY-OF-LIFE.pdf.
445 Supra parts II & IV.
446 South Africa also has critical spillover effects for its neighbors. It has been
estimated that a one percent increase in South African GDP has a one-half or three-
quarters percentage point increase in African growth. South Africa also holds substantial
portfolio holdings in other sub-Saharan countries' stocks. IMF, The Implications of
South African Economic Growth for the Rest of Africa, at 4, IMF WP 05/58 (Mar. 2005).
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country because sometimes or in some areas, America displays
features of third worldism-such as the disparities in quality of life
between blacks and whites," 7 electoral malfunctions, such as the
2000 presidential election," 8 and the governmental response to the
hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in August 2005.' 4  Such an
analogy is facially absurd. As the experiences of the United States
and other developed countries show, even the most economically
advanced countries exhibit features that display particularized
features of underdevelopment.45° Even though South Africa
suffers from some of the problems of developing countries
because of its "two economies," the problems do not approach the
level of those shown by Congo, Zaire, Chad or Cameroon, to use
the countries in Professor Cahn's study45' or Professor Cohn's
Uganda.452  Instead, South Africa is "a productive and
industrialized economy that exhibits many characteristics
associated with developing countries. 4 3 In fact, when observing
a region characterized by fledgling economies, many of which
have come under World Bank-IMF structural adjustment therapy,
South Africa is the only economy that is not "still in a nascent
stage., 45 4 Not being under the tutelage of the multilateral financial
institutions also means that South Africa is able to insulate itself
from globalization pressures such as "privatization," something
many other African countries cannot do.455
447 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Skarupski et al., Black-White Differences in Health-
Related Quality of Life among Older Adults, 16 QUALITY OF LIFE RES. 287,287 (2007).
448 See, e.g., JULIAN M. PLEASANTS, HANGING CHADS (2004).
449 For the New York Times' coverage of the Hurricane Katrina tragedy, see The
Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, http://www.nytimes.com/pages/national/nationalspecial
(last visited Oct. 7, 2007); see also Philip C. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to
Socioeconomic Human Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 417-19 (2006).
450 Even in the area of corporate transparency, the United States is not immune from
occurrences which have the hint of crony capitalism or market malfeasance. See, e.g.,
Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 394 (2004).
451 Cahn supra note 262 at 904.
452 Cohn, supra note 353 at 105.
453 Economy of South Africa, supra note 50.
454 See Joanna Chung, Sub-Saharan Africa Confident It Can Attract Investment, FIN.
TIMES (London), May 2, 2007, at 41.
455 See Pfeifer, supra note 373, at 23-24.
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Another factor which makes South Africa different and renders
it sui generis in Africa is that it has a strong state with the ability
to drive business and corporate reform.456 Witness the DTI reform
initiatives of the corporate governance system, of the kind many
developing countries in Africa lack.457  Recall the statement of
Professor Pinto, commenting on the role of the State in corporate
governance; "[e]ven where there is no ownership [meaning being
a direct investor], the State can try to influence corporate decisions
through regulation or influence., 45 8  The corporate governance
reform initiatives in South Africa, led by the DTI, support this
assertion. 45 9 Another indicator of this strong state role, as well as
evidence of the leadership capability of the ANC government, is
that the tax base in the country has grown enormously in the post-
apartheid era, as indicated by figures for the ten-year period from
March 1996 to March 2006.460 Within this period the tax base
more than doubled from 1.9 million to approximately 5 million
individuals, a record number. 46' As already indicated, under the
able stewardship of the ANC, corporate development in the
country is experiencing steady and healthy growth.462 In a region
infamous for "government failure[s], ' ' 463 the political performance
of the ANC government has been impressive.
To conclude this discussion and to further support the thesis of
South Africa's "exceptionality," the country is analyszed using a
framework of institutional characteristics of economies in Black
Africa that Geoffrey Schneider has devised. The characteristics
456 For an insightful and exhaustive analysis on the concept of the state in Africa,
see CHAZAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 38-42.
457 See, e.g. GUIDELINES OF CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3.
458 Pinto, supra note 97, at 477 n.2.
459 See GUIDELINES OF CORPORATE LAW REFORM, supra note 3.
460 See Russell, supra note 148, at 4.
461 See id. The reason for the phenomenal increase, as Russell indicates, is that
Blacks who refused to comply during apartheid, under ANC directions designed to put
an end to white rule, are now choosing to fulfill their civic duties by paying. Id.
462 Id.
463 See Owens, supra note 438.
464 Indeed, the IMF states "economic activity accelerated steadily [after 1999]
reflecting the dividends of successful reforms and more favorable external conditions."
IMF, South Africa: Selected Issues, at 11, IMF Country Rep. No. 06/328 (September
2006).
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which Schneider indicated undermine the potential effectiveness
of market-based solutions to the economic difficulties African
countries confront are
(1) An oligopolistic banking sector; (2) a weak, insecure state;
(3) a large agricultural sector dominated by peasant farming and
ceremonial behavior; (4) inadequate, deteriorating infrastructure
designed during the colonial period to extract resources from
Africa, rather than to facilitate internal trade; (5) an export
sector dominated by primary products, many of which are facing
declining terms of trade; (6) a small industrial sector that usually
is not internationally competitive, partly due to the small size of
the domestic market; and (7) poorly funded education and health
care systems.
465
None of these features apply to South Africa, even though
there may be questions whether the country is insulated from some
of these "institutional" features.466  The factor that deserves
comment here is the seventh factor, funding of education and
health care systems. Even with the gigantic scale of the
HIV/AIDS challenge the South African government is confronted
with, the country has a revenue base that is stronger than many
African countries and is in a better position to afford increased
funding for this and other social problems, including education,
than many of those other sub-Saharan African countries.4 67  To
further illustrate the uniqueness of South Africa, the fourth factor
relating to "deteriorating infrastructure" deserves further
comment. With a landmass comparable to Nigeria,468 but a
population of only about one-third the size of Nigeria (Africa's
most populous nation), South Africa has more infrastructure, as
the table of statistics below shows:
465 Geoffrey E. Schneider, An Institutionalist Assessment of Structural Adjustment
Programs in Africa, 33 J. ECON. ISSUES 325, 327 (1999).
466 For a comparison and listing of African development features, see AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, SELECTED STATISTICS ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES (2007).
467 Id. at 34.
468 Nigeria has a surface area of 924,000 square kilometers, compared to 1,219,000
square kilometers for South Africa. World Bank, 2005 World Development Indicators at
23-24 (March 2005). Nigeria's population is 136,000,000, compared to South Africa's
population of 46,000,000. Id.
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Indicators (all figures South Africa Nigeria
as of 2002-03)
A. Adult Literacy Rate 87% (Male) 85% 74% (Male) 59%
(Female) (Female)
B. Communications
1. Telephone 107 7
Mainlines (per
thousand people)
2. Mobile Phones (per 364 26
thousand people)
3. Daily Newspapers 26 25
(per thousand people)
4. Television Sets (per 177 103
thousand people)
5. Internet users (per 68 6
thousand people)
C. Transportation
1. Total Road Network 275,971 194,394
(kin)
2. Total Rail Lines 20,041 3,505
(km)
3. Aircraft Departures 147,000 9,000
Source: World Bank, supra note
08, 311-12.
468, at 97-98, 303-04, 307-
Moreover, the South African infrastructure situation is
improving, as the Gautrain project illustrates. To prepare for
South Africa's hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the South
African government has awarded a contract for the construction of
a high-speed (160 km an hour) rail link, part underground and part
above ground, stretching nearly 80 kmi .4 69 Known as the Gautrain
project, the railway, which is praised as the first of its kind in all of
Africa and likened to the London Heathrow Express, is estimated
469 See Alec Russell, Another South African Dream, FIN. TIMES (London) May 18,
2007 (Special Report on the Rail Industry) at 4.
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to cost 26 billion rand.47°
Briefly, South Africa is not a developed country. To find
evidence of this point, one need not look further than the studies of
developed economies, such as the one by Professors Kraakman,
which omits South Africa.471 But the country is also not the type
of underdeveloped economy, such as the Third Worlds of the
Third World or "failed States" of the kind that Western analysts
behold in Africa.4 72  The uniqueness of South Africa confirms
Canadian scholar Timothy M. Shaw's commentary many years
ago regarding the place of Africa in the international system.473
Professor Shaw argued that contemporary Africa has been a social
laboratory for strategies of economic and political change, an
occurrence resulting in "continuities, discontinuities, [and]
massive differentiation among groups, countries, and regions
[within the continent.] '474 Given that the continent's place in the
world order is marked by "differentiated links to international
chains of production[,, ' 471 Shaw counseled that analysts should
approach their analysis of the continent with "a sense of
heterogeneity.' ,
476
The determination that South Africa is sui generis smacks of
irony, given that the purpose of comparative studies is to contrast
similarities and differences among systems to attempt to provide
an accounting of why those similarities and differences exist.477 It
470 Id.
471 See, e.g., KRAAKMAN, ET AL., supra note 239.
472 For example, South Africa's GDP growth has greatly outstripped that of
Zimbabawe, Cote d'Ivoire and Cameroon. International Monetary Fund, World
Economic Outlook, at 75 (Apr. 2007).
473 Timothy M. Shaw & Clement E. Adibe, Africa and Global Developments in the
Twenty-first Century, 51 INT'LJ. 1, 3-9, 21-22 (1995-96).
474 Id. at 21-22.
475 Timothy M. Shaw, State of Crisis: International Constraints, Contradictions,
and Capitalisms?, in THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA 307,
308 (Donald Rothchild & Naomi Chazan eds., 1988); see also CHAZAN ET AL., supra
note 42, at 33 ( noting that "[hieterogeneity and complexity in conditions of uncertainty
have marked the recent history" of the continent).
476 Shaw & Adibe, supra note 473, at 6. See also Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New
World Order: The Trouble with the Notion of African Marginalization, 9 TULANE J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 187, 200-202 (2001) (critiquing marginalization theory as applied to
Africa).
477 See supra note 214-17 and accompanying texts.
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also raises the question regarding whether, given its exceptional
features, South Africa holds any "lessons out [t]here in the
field,, 478 for the scholarship on the law of comparative corporate
governance.
C. Reasons Why Despite Its Exceptionality, South Africa Still
Holds Important Lessons for the Scholarship on the Law
of Comparative Corporate Governance
Despite its exceptional features, South Africa still holds
important lessons for potential contribution to the scholarship on
the law of comparative corporate governance. First, comparative
studies, including the scholarship on the law of comparative
corporate governance, do not just measure and account for only
similarities, they also account for both similarities and
differences. 479 To analogize to the field of statistics, outliers still
make it within the scattergram-or else there would be no way to
determine if they were outliers to begin with.4 80 The same should
be true too of comparative corporate governance. Comparative
law seeks to ferret out lessons from various regions of the world
that could influence the development of law in an attempt to move
scholarship safely away from description to explanation in the best
traditions of the field. 481 Exceptional cases, such as South Africa,
have a role here. They can contribute richness, complexity, and
even a measure of analytic depth that can save the student of
comparative law from the mortal sin of over-generalization.
Increasingly, the principles of comparative governance law
resonate in the corporate governance discourse in South Africa.482
Moreover, the African country's attempt to reform its corporate
governance law can enrich the discussion now in the literature on
corporate governance reform.483  Second, South Africa has
intrinsic comparative value and utility that many countries in the
world lack such comparative scholarship regarding the law on
comparative corporate governance, need to exploit or tap. These
478 Cahn, supra note 262, at 893.
479 See supra note 214-221 and accompanying texts.
480 See generally JAMES T. MCCLAVE & TERRY SINCICH, STATISTICS (10th ed. 2006).
481 See supra nn. 214-21 and accompanying texts.
482 See supra Part VI Section A.
483 See Paredes, supra note 231, at 1055.
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exceptional features include its multiracial and multi-ethnic
composition; monumental challenges, such as HIV/AIDS; and
successful experience with conflict resolution and the
reconstruction of a state and society once riven by apartheid.484
The country is also cited as a rare instance of successful
application of human rights in United States' foreign policy.
485
VII.Conclusion
Good management of corporations is critical to the corporate
and economic development of any country, whether developed or
developing. As former World Bank President, James Wolfensohn,
once famously predicted: "[t]he proper governance of companies
will become as crucial to the world economy as the proper
governing of countries. 486 Despite this wisdom, scholarship on
comparative corporate governance gives short shrift to Sub-
Saharan Africa.487 That is changing.488 In summary, (1) South
Africa's attempt to reform its law of corporate governance identify
critical issues and concepts within the scholarship on comparative
corporate law, but that (2) South Africa is sui generis, and (3) yet,
despite its exceptional features, the African country holds
important lessons that form important contributions to the law and
scholarship on comparative corporate governance.489
484 See Marina Ottaway, SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ORDER (1993)
for a specific treatment of these topics. For issues related to national conflict in Southern
Africa generally, see THOMAS OHLSON & STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN WITH ROBERT DAVIES,
THE NEW IS NOT YET BORN (1994). These two works are part of the Brookings Series on
Conflict Resolution in Africa and also include GOVERNANCE AS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
(I. William Zartman ed., 1996); FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS
RESPONSIBILITY (1996); FRANCIS M. DENG, WAR OF VISIONS (1995); TERRENCE LYONS &
AHMED I. SAMATAR, SOMALIA: STATE COLLAPSE, MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION, AND
STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (1995); and CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN
AFRICA (Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman eds., 1991).
485 See Pauline H. Baker, Getting It Right: U.S. Policy in South Africa, in
IMPLEMENTING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 85-112, 85 (Debra Liang-Fenton ed., 2004).
Professor Baker states that the U.S. "was an important and, in many ways, critical actor
in the transition" in South Africa, but also makes clear, as she should, that "[the
responsibility for moving South Africa from apartheid to democracy lies primarily with
the people of South Africa." Id. at 85.
486 Cited in Mongalo, supra note 2, at 102.
487 Supra Part V. Section B.
488 Supra Part V.
489 Id.
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Two possible avenues are open for future research on South
Africa that could also increase the scholarship on comparative
corporate governance. The first concerns non-speculative
confirmation of the ownership model that prevails in the country,
whether it be dispersed or concentrated. This determination will
be critical in designing "agency costs" abuses for the country. 490 A
second avenue for future research on the country builds into
Professor Pinto's counsel concerning the productivity of defining
and drawing "stakeholder" too broadly. 491 That issue is: given the
controversial nature of affirmative action in countries as diverse as
the United States and South Africa, where these policies are in
place, to what extent can preferential programs, of the type
mandated by the BEE Act in South Africa, constitute best practice
in corporate governance?
490 See supra nn. 245 & 406.
491 See supra note 403.
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